NO MATTER how often China has emphasised the idea of a peaceful rise, the pace and nature of its military modernisation inevitably cause alarm. As America and the big European powers reduce their defence spending, China looks likely to maintain the past decade’s increases of about 12% a year. Even though its defence budget is less than a quarter the size of America’s today, China’s generals are ambitious. The country is on course to become the world’s largest military spender in just 20 years or so (see article).无论中国如何一再强调和平崛起的理念，它国防现代化的步伐与性质不可避免地引起了恐慌。就在美国与欧洲大国削减军费之际，中国似乎会像过去十年一样，保持大约12%的军费年增长率。尽管它的国防预算还不到今日美国的四分之一，但中国将军们雄心毕露。照此情况，短短20年左右，中国将成为世界上军费支出最大的国家。

Much of its effort is aimed at deterring America from intervening in a future crisis over Taiwan. China is investing heavily in “asymmetric capabilities” designed to blunt America’s once-overwhelming capacity to project power in the region. This “anti-access/area denial” approach includes thousands of accurate land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, modern jets with anti-ship missiles, a fleet of submarines (both conventionally and nuclear-powered), long-range radars and surveillance satellites, and cyber and space weapons intended to “blind” American forces. Most talked about is a new ballistic missile said to be able to put a manoeuvrable warhead onto the deck of an aircraft-carrier 2,700km (1,700 miles) out at sea.

它的许多努力是为了震慑美国，令其不敢轻易介入未来的台海危机。美国曾具有向该地区投放兵力的压倒优势；为制衡这一能力，中国斥巨资发展“不对称能力”。这种“反介入/地区封锁”方式包括数以千计的精密陆基弹道或巡航导弹、装载了反舰导弹的现代化战机、大批常规与核动力潜艇、远程雷达和间谍卫星、以及旨在“致盲”美军的网络与太空武器。人们谈论最多的是一种新型弹道导弹，据说它可携带机动弹头，击中2700公里（1700英里）外的海上航母。

China says all this is defensive, but its tactical doctrines emphasise striking first if it must. Accordingly, China aims to be able to launch disabling attacks on American bases in the western Pacific and push America’s carrier groups beyond what it calls the “first island chain”, sealing off the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea inside an arc running from the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south. Were Taiwan to attempt formal secession from the mainland, China could launch a series of pre-emptive strikes to delay American intervention and raise its cost prohibitively.

中国声称所有这些都是防御性的，但它的战术准则强调必要时的先发制人。有鉴于此，中国致力于发展能够使美国在西太平洋军事基地瘫痪的攻击能力，并迫使美国航母战斗群退至它所称的“第一岛链”之外；该岛链北起阿留申群岛、南至婆罗洲 [注1]，以一个横亘万里的弧形长链，将黄海、中国南海和中国东海尽锁其中。如果台湾试图正式脱离大陆，中国可以发动一系列先发制人的袭击，延缓美国干涉，并使干涉的代价达到其无法承受的程度。

This has already had an effect on China’s neighbours, who fear that it will draw them into its sphere of influence. Japan, South Korea, India and even Australia are quietly spending more on defence, especially on their navies. Barack Obama’s new “pivot” towards Asia includes a clear signal that America will still guarantee its allies’ security. This week a contingent of 200 US marines arrived in Darwin, while India took formal charge of a nuclear submarine, leased from Russia.

这一方针已对中国的邻国产生了影响，它们担心被中国划入自己的势力范围。日本、韩国、印度，甚至澳大利亚都悄悄地增加了军费，特别是增加了海军开支。巴拉克•奥巴马的亚洲新“轴心”包含了一个清晰的信号：美国仍将保证其盟国的安全。本周一支由200名美国海军陆战队队员组成的特遣队抵达达尔文港，而印度则正式接收了一艘从俄罗斯租用的核潜艇。

En garde 警戒

The prospect of an Asian arms race is genuinely frightening, but prudent concern about China’s build-up must not lapse into hysteria. For the moment at least, China is far less formidable than hawks on both sides claim. Its armed forces have had no real combat experience for more than 30 years, whereas America’s have been fighting, and learning, constantly. The capacity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for complex joint operations in a hostile environment is untested. China’s formidable missile and submarine forces would pose a threat to American carrier groups near its coast, but not farther out to sea for some time at least. Blue-water operations for China’s navy are limited to anti-piracy patrolling in the Indian Ocean and the rescue of Chinese workers from war-torn Libya. Two or three small aircraft-carriers may soon be deployed, but learning to use them will take many years. Nobody knows if the “carrier-killer” missile can be made to work.

亚洲军备竞赛的前景确实令人担心，但对中国武力增长的谨慎关切切不可发展到歇斯底里的程度。至少现在，中国还远未达到双方鹰派渲染的那种可怕程度。三十多年来，它的军队没有战争经验，而美军则一直在战争中学习战争。人民解放军（PLA）在敌对区域多军种、多兵种联合作战的综合能力尚未得到检验。中国令人惧怕的导弹与潜艇力量将对接近其海岸的美国航母战斗群形成威胁，但至少在一段时间内无法在远海形成同样的威胁。中国海军的远洋行动还仅限于在印度洋执行反海盗巡逻，以及从战火纷飞的利比亚解救中国工人。它或许很快会部署二至三艘小型航母，但学习使用航母需要许多年。谁也不知道所谓“航母杀手”是否真的有效。

As for China’s longer-term intentions, the West should acknowledge that it is hardly unnatural for a rising power to aspire to have armed forces that reflect its growing economic clout. China consistently devotes a bit over 2% of GDP to defence—about the same as Britain and France and half of what America spends. That share may fall if Chinese growth slows or the government faces demands for more social spending. China might well use force to stop Taiwan from formally seceding. Yet, apart from claims over the virtually uninhabited Spratly and Paracel Islands, China is not expansionist: it already has its empire. Its policy of non-interference in the affairs of other states constrains what it can do itself.

说到中国的远期目标，西方应该承认，一个崛起的大国渴望让自己的国防力量与其不断增长的经济实力相称是很自然的。中国的防务开支一直只比GDP的2%多一点——这与英国与法国相当，只是美国这一比例的一半。如果中国经济增长放缓或政府需要更多的社会开支，这一比例可能会降低。中国很有可能会使用武力阻止台湾正式独立。但除了声索实际上无人居住的南沙与西沙群岛以外，中国并无领土扩张野心：它已经有了自己庞大的版图。它奉行不干涉他国内政的政策，因此束缚了自己的手脚。

The trouble is that China’s intentions are so unpredictable. On the one hand China is increasingly willing to engage with global institutions. Unlike the old Soviet Union, it has a stake in the liberal world economic order, and no interest in exporting a competing ideology. The Communist Party’s legitimacy depends on being able to honour its promise of prosperity. A cold war with the West would undermine that. On the other hand, China engages with the rest of the world on its own terms, suspicious of institutions it believes are run to serve Western interests. And its assertiveness, particularly in maritime territorial disputes, has grown with its might. The dangers of military miscalculation are too high for comfort.

麻烦的是中国的意图太难以捉摸。一方面，中国越来越愿意参与全球性国际组织的事务。与过去的苏联不同，自由的国际经济秩序牵涉中国利益，而且它无意输出与资本主义对抗的意识形态。共产党的正统地位依赖于实现自己承诺的国家繁荣。与西方冷战对此不利。另一方面，中国是从自己的利益出发与外界交往的，当它相信某些国际组织是为西方利益服务时就对它们心怀疑虑。而且它的自负——特别是在海上领土问题上——也随其实力的增长而增加。军事误判的风险之高令人不安。

How to avoid accidents 如何避免意外

It is in China’s interests to build confidence with its neighbours, reduce mutual strategic distrust with America and demonstrate its willingness to abide by global norms. A good start would be to submit territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas to international arbitration. Another step would be to strengthen promising regional bodies such as the East Asian Summit and ASEAN Plus Three. Above all, Chinese generals should talk far more with American ones. At present, despite much Pentagon prompting, contacts between the two armed forces are limited, tightly controlled by the PLA and ritually frozen by politicians whenever they want to “punish” America—usually because of a tiff over Taiwan.

增进与邻国的互信、加强与美国的战略互信、证明它愿意按照全球准则行事，这些是符合中国利益的。将中国南海和中国东海上岛屿的领土争端提交国际仲裁会是一个良好开端。另一个手段可以是加强有前途的地区组织如东亚峰会 [注2] 与东盟自由贸易区加三 [注3]。最重要的是，中国将军应与美国将军多加交流。当前，尽管五角大楼采取了许多主动行动，但两国军方接触有限。这是由于人民解放军对此的严格控制，以及中国政治家对此时有冻结——此举时常是因两国在台湾问题上发生争吵而对美国施加的“惩罚”。

America’s response should mix military strength with diplomatic subtlety. It must retain the ability to project force in Asia: to do otherwise would feed Chinese hawks’ belief that America is a declining power which can be shouldered aside. But it can do more to counter China’s paranoia. To his credit, Mr Obama has sought to lower tensions over Taiwan and made it clear that he does not want to contain China (far less encircle it as Chinese nationalists fear). America must resist the temptation to make every security issue a test of China’s good faith. There are bound to be disagreements between the superpowers; and if China cannot pursue its own interests within the liberal world order, it will become more awkward and potentially belligerent. That is when things could get nasty.

美国应将军事力量与外交技巧结合以应对这一形势。它必须保持向亚洲投放兵力的能力，否则将增强中国鹰派的信念，让他们认为美国是一个正在衰退的大国，可以不予理睬。但它还可以做其他事情来对抗中国的偏执。值得赞扬的是，奥巴马寻求缓和由于台湾问题造成的紧张，并清楚地表明他不想遏制中国，更远非中国民族主义者担心的那样想包围中国。美国必须抗拒诱惑，不用一个个安全问题检验中国的善意。超级大国之间必然会有许多意见相左之处；如果中国无法在自由的世界秩序规范下谋求自己的利益，它就会变得越来越不易与别国来往，也有可能会好战。那时候这个世界可能就不安全了。

[注1] 阿留申群岛在白令海与北太平洋之间，自阿拉斯加半島向西伸延至堪察加半島。婆罗洲即加里曼丹岛，为世界第三大岛，其上有三个国家：马来西亚、印尼与文莱。

[注2] 东亚峰会是每年一次由泛东亚地区国家领导人参加的会议，参加国有澳大利亚、文莱、柬埔寨、中国、印度、印尼、日本、老挝、马来西亚、缅甸、新西兰、菲律宾、俄罗斯、新加坡、韩国、泰国、美国和越南。

[注3] 东盟自由贸易区加三是东南亚地区性贸易组织，其中包括东盟10国，外加中国、日本、韩国，另有印度、澳大利亚、新西兰和俄罗斯为观察员国。