In the debate over the future of China's growth, one factor typically animates the bulls more than any other: the country's sheer size. One way or another, this undergirds most optimistic scenarios. China is so big it can absorb years and years of public-works spending without waste becoming a drag. The population is so large, and still sufficiently poor, that there is seemingly infinite scope for catch-up growth.

在有关中国经济增长未来趋势的争论中，有一个因素往往比其他任何因素都更让人感到乐观，那就是中国经济的规模。这一事实以各种方式为大多数乐观的设想提供了支撑。因为中国经济体量非常庞大，足以吸纳经年累月的公共项目支出，即使有所浪费也不会拖后腿。中国的人口数量非常庞大，且仍然足够贫穷，“追赶型增长”在中国似乎还有着无限的空间。

The reality is very different. China's mammoth proportions are likely to become a serious and growing problem as the economy enters a new phase of development─and particularly as it tries to transition from its current role as the world's low-cost factory to a value-added manufacturing power.

然而现实远非如此。随着经济进入新的发展阶段，尤其是随着中国努力从目前所扮演的世界低成本工厂的角色向价值增值型制造业大国的转型，中国的庞大体量很可能成为一个严重的且越来越突出的问题。

The argument that China has scope for catch-up growth hinges on the fact that its average standard of living is only 17% of America's (when measured using purchasing-power parity, with prices calibrated to U.S. levels). By contrast, Japan ended its near-10% growth phase in the mid-1970s with average standard of living at more than 70% of America's. Some interpret this to mean that for the foreseeable future China can achieve rapid growth simply by importing technologies to boost the productivity of its cheap labor force as it converges on America's standard of living.

认为中国还有追赶型增长空间的依据是，中国的平均生活水平仅为美国的17%（按购买力平价衡量，物价按美国水平校准）。相比之下，日本在上世纪70年代中期结束将近10%的经济增长阶段时，平均生活水平为美国的70%以上。一些人认为，这意味着，在可预见的未来，随着中国的生活水平向美国趋同，中国仅通过进口技术来提高廉价劳动力的生产效率，就能实现快速增长。

This misses a key point, however. China can physically raise production, but that will sustain growth only if China can sell the extra products. And if it can't sell them abroad, then it can grow only by selling more at home.

不过，这种理论忽视了一个关键问题。中国可以提高产出，但是只有在中国能够卖出额外产出的情况下，这种增长才是可持续的。如果中国不能把产品卖到国外，那么，只有增加在国内的销售，中国的经济才能实现增长。

Small countries can go on capturing shares in big world markets until their income per head catches up. Big countries can't, unless they make world markets commensurately bigger. Either their share of world consumption must grow or their share of world production will stop growing.

小国可以在庞大的世界市场不断获得份额，直到其人均收入追赶上来。大国则不行，除非这些大国能让市场也相应地扩大。如果大国在全球消费中的占比无法增加，那么它们在全球产出中的占比就无法增加。

China already dominates both production and capacity at the low-value-added assembly end of manufacturing. China's huge size means that to maintain stellar growth rates, the economy needs to move up the value-added chain fast and grab more export market share. But to generate domestic consumption, wages need to rise─undermining the competitive edge that would allow China to grab more export market share.

在制造业低附加值的流水线环节，中国在产量和产能方面都已经占据主导地位。中国的庞大规模意味着，为了保持较高的增速，中国经济需要迅速向价值增值链的上游移动，获得更多出口市场份额。但是，为了拉动国内消费，需要提高工资水平，而这削弱了可能让中国获得更多出口市场份额的竞争优势。

A seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap labor has been one of the key ingredients of China's miraculous growth, but now China could be reaching a 'Lewis turning point.'

表面看来用之不竭的廉价劳动力供应曾一直是中国奇迹般的经济增长的关键原因，但是眼下中国可能正在迎来一个刘易斯拐点。

Described by 20th-century economist Arthur Lewis, this is the point at which excess labor in low-productivity industries has been fully absorbed into the high-productivity industries. At this point wages begin to rise as competition for workers becomes fiercer, and corporate profits are squeezed. In January the International Monetary Fund released a paper arguing that China will reach the Lewis turning point between 2020 and 2025. But other evidence suggests we're already there. Wages have been rising for years now, and profits in 2012 fell sharply─both telltale signs.

“刘易斯拐点”这一概念由20世纪经济学家刘易斯(Arthur Lewis)提出。当经济处于“刘易斯拐点”之际，生产率较低产业中的剩余劳动力已经被完全吸收到生产率较高的产业中。从这时起，随着企业招聘工人的竞争愈发激烈，工资开始上升，企业利润因而受到挤压。今年1月国际货币基金组织(IMF) 发布的一份文件称，中国经济将在2020年至2025年间出现“刘易斯拐点”。但有其它证据表明，中国经济已经处于这一拐点。工资已经上涨多年，企业利润在2012年大幅下滑，这两个迹象均表明“刘易斯拐点”已经出现。

Here again China's size works against it. The rise in productivity and wages is a great boon for workers in high-productivity jobs. But many of China's workers don't have the higher skills necessary for the economy to move up the value-added chain. And the squeeze on corporate profits engendered by the Lewis turning point will make it harder for companies to invest in boosting the productivity of today's low-skilled workers.

但中国经济体量在这里起到了反向的作用。生产率和工资的上升对身处高生产率工种的工人来说是一大福音。但很多中国工人缺乏中国经济向价值增值链上游移动所必须的更高技能，而“刘易斯拐点”造成企业利润受到挤压将增加企业为提高目前低技能工人的生产率而进行投资的难度。

There's also the question of how productive today's high-productivity workers really are. On the plane back from Shanghai recently, I sat next to an Italian gentleman who produces valves. He manufactures low-quality ones in China and high-quality ones in Italy, where he uses much more complicated machinery. I asked him why he doesn't import the machinery to China and produce higher-quality valves more cheaply. He responded that a Chinese competitor of his bought two machines from him with that idea in mind but had to shut both down within six months because he lacked the qualified workers to operate them.

还有一个问题是，目前位于高生产率行业的工人其生产率究竟如何？最近从上海搭飞机回来时，我旁边坐的是一位生产阀门的意大利男士。他在中国生产低质量阀门，在意大利生产高质量阀门。他在意大利使用的加工机械要复杂的多。我问他，为什么不在中国进口这些机械，然后以更低的成本生产更高质量的阀门。他回答说，他在中国的竞争对手有过同一想法，这位对手曾从他这里购买了两台设备，但六个月不到就不得不停止生产，因为找不到合格的操作工人。

China may still have abundant rural labor supply, but it has a shortage of the skilled labor supply it now needs. Labor shortage is good news for consumer incomes (at least for those consumers whose labor warrants the higher wages) but only if consumer spending rises at the same or faster pace than consumer incomes, and productivity growth is the same as or exceeds wage growth. If not, profits will be decimated, which will then feed into lower consumer incomes. There are some signs that this is happening in China, where the household consumption rate continued to fall in 2012.

中国的农村劳动力供给可能依然充裕，但中国缺少其目前所需的熟练劳动力供给。劳动力短缺对消费者收入来说是好消息（至少对那些其工种能带来较高工资的消费者而言），但前提是消费者支出上升的速度等于或快于消费者收入上升的速度，且生产率上升的速度等于或超过工资上升的速度，否则利润将锐减，然后将导致消费者收入下降。已有一些迹象表明中国正在发生这种情况，比如中国2012年居民消费率就曾持续下跌。

The world isn't big enough for China to rise up the value-added chain without generating domestic consumer spending. Policy makers in Beijing seem to acknowledge this, but creating genuinely independent Chinese consumers will be difficult work.

全球市场并未大到能够让中国在向价值增值链上游移动的同时，又无需创造必要的国内消费者支出予以支撑。北京的决策者似乎承认这一点，但要培育真正独立的中国消费者并非易事。