Stocks are expensive. Bonds are expensive. What is an investor to do? Unfortunately, the only answer appears to be to invest in new and unfamiliar assets, taking new and unfamiliar risks.

股票很贵，债券也很贵。投资者该如何是好呢？不幸的是，唯一的答案可能就是投资陌生的新资产，冒一些陌生的新风险。

Both equities and bonds look expensive compared with their own history (dramatically so in the case of bonds). Put the two together and the plight of pension funds with fixed liabilities to meet appears impossible. Cliff Asness, a former academic who now runs AQR Capital Management in New York, says the prospective return over the next decade from a portfolio invested 60 per cent in US equities and 40 per cent in bonds is 2.4 per cent per year. This is the worst predicted return in 112 years.

股票和债券似乎都比过去贵很多（尤其是债券）。将二者结合起来，有着固定给付义务的退休基金似乎就面对着不可能的任务。学者出身、目前负责纽约AQR资产管理公司(AQR Capital Management)运营的克里夫•阿斯内斯(Cliff Asness)表示，未来10年期间，一个60%投资美国股票、40%投资债券的组合投资，平均每年有望实现的回报大概是2.4%。这是112年以来最差的预期回报。

An alternative forecast by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, financial historians at the London Business School, points to the extreme low real interest rates and shows that these have been associated over history with low subsequent returns for both equities and stocks.

伦敦商学院(London Business School)金融历史学家埃洛伊•迪姆森(Elroy Dimson)、保罗•马什(Paul Marsh)和麦克•斯坦顿(Mike Staunton)做出了另一种预测，他们指出实际利率非常低，并指出，历史上这种局面与股票和债券随后的低回报率有联系。

They suggest that the returns in the late 20th century were driven by unrepeatable positive factors such as the postwar booms in Germany and Japan, and the fall of the iron curtain. Now, global demographics give institutions no room for manoeuvre. As the “baby boom” cohort retires, the balance shifts from those contributing to pensions to those receiving payouts.

他们提出，20世纪末的回报率是受到不可重复的积极因素所驱动，比如战后德国和日本的繁荣以及铁幕的倒下。如今，全球人口结构使得各机构没有回旋余地。随着“婴儿潮”一代人的退休，重心从那些缴纳退休金缴款的人，倒向领取退休金的人。

Further, the quantitative easing policy of the US Federal Reserve, to keep bond yields down, in effect forces savings groups to lend to the government at low rates, while making it more expensive for “defined-benefit” pensions, which have promised a set level of pension, to fund future liabilities.

此外，美联储(Fed)旨在压低债券收益率的量化宽松政策，实际上是在迫使储蓄阶层以低利率借钱给政府，并使承诺提供确定水平养老金的“固定福利”退休金在兑现未来给付方面更加昂贵。

As a result, a recent survey by the Create consultancy of more than 700 asset managers, managing $27.4tn between them, found that 78 per cent of defined-benefit plans would need annual returns of at least 5 per cent per year to meet their commitments, while 19 per cent required more than 8 per cent – far higher than reasonable projections.

因此，咨询机构Create最近对700多位资产管理人（他们管理着27.4万亿美元的资产）的调查显示，78%的固定福利计划至少需要达到5%的年回报率，才能兑现承诺，其中19%需要达到8%以上的年回报率，比合理的预期高很多。

One result is that fund managers are charging less for their services. Fees that were acceptable when returns were high now look unsightly. Also, institutions are firing “active” managers and moving money to cheaper “passive” managers who merely match market benchmarks.

一个结果就是基金经理的服务费降低。回报高的时候曾经可接受的费用现在看来不合理。同时，各机构纷纷裁掉“积极型”经理人，将资金转向只追逐市场基准的“被动型”经理人。

“For every five active mandates that come up for renewal, three end up in passives or exchange traded funds,” said one fund manager interviewed by Create.

Create采访的一位基金经理人说：“每五份到了续期时间的积极型管理授权中，有三份会变成被动型管理或交易所交易基金(ETF)的授权。”

Institutions are also taking on more risk. According to Mr Asness, a target of 5 per cent per year can be reached but only “by using the three dirty words of finance – leverage, shorting and derivatives”.

各机构也在承担更大的风险。阿斯内斯认为，每年5%的回报率是可以实现的，但只能“通过金融领域的三个脏词：杠杆、卖空、衍生品”。

Laurence Wormald of Sungard, a London-based consultant, says: “People are faced with the reality of having to look beyond low-risk asset classes, which will have negative returns. This forces them into unconventional asset allocation.”

伦敦咨询机构Sungard的劳伦斯•沃玛尔德(Laurence Wormald)说：“人们面临的现实是，眼光必须超越低风险的资产类别，这些资产的回报率将是负值。这迫使他们将资金配置到非传统资产。”

He warns that funds will have to change their risk management to strategies used by the trading desks of investment banks. They must factor in the chances of losses, look at “tail risks” of extreme events and at the risk that counterparties’ credit fails – all disciplines found wanting in 2008.

他警告称，基金将必须改变其风险管理，采用投资银行的交易部门所用的策略。他们必须考虑亏损几率，考察极端情况的“尾部风险”和交易对方信用崩溃的风险——这些都是2008年金融危机爆发时缺乏的。

They are also looking at new asset classes. Hedge funds, which can use leverage and sell short, have enjoyed huge inflows from large institutions, increasing their assets by more than $500bn, or almost a third, since their pre-crisis peak. They have done this despite very poor performance. Pension funds would have been better leaving their money in stocks – and are reassessing the move.

他们也在寻求新的资产类别。大型机构近年有大量资金流入可以利用杠杆并卖空的对冲基金，使得它们的资产比危机之前的高峰增加了5000多亿美元，增幅接近三分之一。他们这么操作的背景是，对冲基金近年表现并不好。如果将资金留在股市，退休基金的状况会更好一些，它们正在重新评估这些投资。

The most popular new asset class is property, named by 55 per cent of defined-benefit managers as part of their plan to close the gap with their pension promises, while 44 per cent said they were investing in “alternative credit”. This gained a bad name during the crisis and includes senior loans, collateralised loan obligations, subordinated corporate debt and commercial mortgages.

最受欢迎的新资产类别是房地产，有55%的固定福利经理人将其列为填补退休金给付缺口的一部分，而44%的人表示他们在投资“替代信贷”。危机期间这些信贷名声扫地，包括高级贷款、担保贷款凭证、附属公司债券以及商业抵押贷款。

The retreat of banks from these markets, post-crisis, has added to the interest from fund managers, as these assets become available to them on more favourable terms. “Like real assets, alternative credit has one overriding virtue,” says Amin Rajan of Create. “[It has] low correlation with traditional equities and bonds, and high single-digit yields.”

后危机时期银行从这些市场的撤离，增加了基金经理人的兴趣，因为他们能以更有利的条款获取这些资产。Create的Amin Rajan表示，“与实体资产类似，替代信贷有一个关键特征，即它与传统股票和债券的关联度较低，而收益率较高，接近10%。”

There are dangers in moving beyond core competencies but pension funds know that if they stick with bonds and stocks they will probably fail to meet their promises.

超出自己的核心胜任范围是有风险的，但退休基金知道，如果他们留在股市和债市，很可能就无法兑现承诺。

The London Business School professors are emphatic that the old way is not an option. “To assume that savers can confidently expect large wealth increases from investing over the long term in the stock market – in essence, that the investment conditions of the 1990s will return – is delusional,” they say.

上述几位伦敦商学院教授强调，传统方式不是一种选择。他们认为，“储蓄者确信能从股市长线投资中获得大量财富增值的假设（本质上来说就是期待上世纪90年代的投资条件回归）是一种幻觉。”