Suntech Power Holdings was once the biggest solar-panel maker in the world by production volume, its founder Shi Zhenrong was the richest man in China and the offshore parent company was listed in New York with a market capitalisation of $16bn.

尚德电力控股有限公司（Suntech Power Holdings，简称尚德电力控股）曾经是世界上产量最大的太阳能电池板制造商，其创始人施正荣曾是中国首富。这家公司是无锡尚德(Wuxi Suntech)的离岸母公司，在纽约上市，市值曾一度升值160亿美元。

Then in March, Wuxi Suntech, its principal subsidiary, filed for bankruptcy under China’s new revitalisation law. Chinese banks are owed about $2.3bn by the mainland entity according to filings as of year-end 2011. Creditors to the offshore parent, a group with claims of almost $600m that includes several hedge funds as well as the IFC arm of the World Bank, are also attempting to recover their loans. The offshore parent has not filed for bankruptcy and is still operating.

今年3月份，尚德电力控股的主要子公司无锡尚德根据中国新的破产法申请破产。截至2011年底的档案显示，无锡尚德对中国各大银行的欠款约为23亿美元。尚德电力控股的债权人也在努力追讨贷款，其中包括持有近6亿美元债权的多家对冲基金和世界银行(WB)下属国际金融公司(IFC)。尚德电力控股尚未申请破产，依然处于运营之中。

The case is being watched closely as China tries to reconcile its competing priorities. It isn’t clear what Suntech’s ultimate fate will be – whether the Chinese units will be bailed out in the name of job creation and social stability; or made prey for a healthy competitor as part of a much needed rationalisation of the solar industry; or even left to fend for itself. The outcome will provide clues to the choices Beijing makes at this inflection point in its economic growth and development model – as well as clues about whether local governments resist or adhere to edicts from the capital.

在该案受到密切关注之时，中国正在尝试排列好彼此冲突的政策重点。无锡尚德是否会以创造就业和社会稳定的名义得到救助；还是为了实现太阳能行业迫切需要的合理化，由一家健康的竞争对手收购它；抑或是让它“自生自灭”，尚德的最终命运还不明朗。其结果将反映出中国政府在经济增长与发展模式拐点到来之际所做出的选择，地方政府是抗拒还是服从中央政府的命令，也能从中看出端倪。

Since March, there have been a number of surprises. Until then, creditors assumed that China Inc would bail out the ailing company “in the mysterious Chinese way,” says one creditor. That didn’t happen. In addition, few people had expected the big Chinese banks to be the ones that ultimately pulled the plug on Wuxi Suntech, even though that is likely to trigger big writedowns for them.

今年3月份以来，中国发生了诸多意外事件。一位债权人说，在此之前，债权人都认为“中国公司”(China Inc)会以“一种神秘的中国方式”救助这家陷入困境的公司。但实际上并不是如此。此外，几乎没有人预料到，大型中国银行最终竟然对无锡尚德见死不救，尽管它们的资产可能被大幅减计。

The fact that the banks were the ones to cease supporting Suntech suggests Beijing is trying to shift away from its previous growth model that relied on allocating cheap capital to chosen sectors. This approach treated the banks as instruments of state policy rather than institutions that allocated capital to those who can use it most efficiently and profitably.

银行不再支持尚德的事实表明，政府正在试图转变以往向选定行业分配廉价资金的增长模式。在以往的模式下，银行变成了执行国家政策的工具，而不能将资金分配给能最有效利用资金、获得最高盈利的机构。

Suntech’s plight is the result of chronic over-investment in sectors that the government considers its priority. “Demand for our products depends on government subsidies,” its financial statements baldly declare. Those official subsidies include cheap capital from banks including China Development Bank, a policy lender, and the listed, more commercial Bank of China, as well as preferential taxes, according to Suntech regulatory filings. By finally saying no, the banks are embarking on a new era.

无锡尚德陷入如今的困境，是政府长期对重点领域过度投资的结果。尚德财报坦率指出：“我们产品的需求取决于政府补贴。”尚德提交给监管部门的文件显示，官方补贴包括来自政策性银行国开行(CDB)以及更加商业化的上市银行中国银行(BoC)等银行的廉价资金，以及税收优惠。银行最终的拒绝标志着一个新时期的开始。

The solar business, like the semiconductor chip business, is notoriously volatile. In 2010, the company’s net income was $238m, but the following year it produced a net loss of more than $1bn. In addition, Suntech is the victim of considerable mismanagement. It set up investment arms that suffered big losses. There were also related party transactions as it did business with a unit Mr Shi controlled, according to filings with the Securities & Exchange Commission.

与半导体芯片业务类似，太阳能业务向来是非常不稳定的。2010年，无锡尚德实现净收入2.38亿美元，但次年就净亏损逾10亿美元。此外，尚德也是严重管理不善的受害者。其设立的投资分支亏损严重。提交给美国证交会(SEC)的文件显示，尚德在与施正荣控股的一家公司开展业务的时候，还发生了关联交易。

One reason that the outcome isn’t yet clear is because the local governments have priorities that differ considerably from those of Beijing. The local government of Wuxi, in Jiangsu province near Shanghai, which supported Suntech from the start, would like to see it saved – not least because of the thousands of jobs it and its 400 suppliers provide.

尚德命运还不明朗的一个原因，就是地方政府与中央政府的政策重点分歧严重。江苏省无锡市距离上海很近，当地政府希望尚德“获救”，因而从一开始就支持尚德，尤其是考虑到尚德及其400家供应商提供的数千个就业岗位。

Moreover, Wuxi appears to be the first locality in China to establish its own asset management company. This unit could eventually be a source of funds for a future recapitalisation of Suntech.

此外，无锡可能是中国第一座建立自己的资产管理公司的城市。该公司最终可能会成为尚德未来资本重组的资金来源之一。

Meanwhile, Wuxi Guolien Development Group, an investment company with close links to the Wuxi city government is leading talks on restructuring the debt on the Chinese side. It recently appointed one of its own, Zhou Weiping, as a new director of the company in a sign creditors and advisers say they regard as hopeful, as it makes a rescue deal more likely.

与此同时，与无锡市政府关系密切的投资公司无锡市国联发展集团(Wuxi Guolien Development Group)正在就无锡尚德的债务重组开展协商。最近，该集团任命其内部人士周卫平为尚德新任总裁，债权人和顾问表示，这让他们看到了希望的迹象，因为这增加了达成救助协议的可能性。

In many past restructurings, the outcome has been seen as arbitrary, a reflection of China’s lack of experience in debt renegotiations, which stems from a system where bank loans are more akin to state grants than commercial debts that are meant to be repaid. This time offshore creditors, who have promised forbearance until August 30, hope the outcome will be more favourable, at least partly because Suntech has so many valuable offshore assets that could be seized.

以往多起中国企业重组的结果都被视为过于轻率，这反映出中国在债务再谈判方面的经验不足，而其根源是在中国体制下，银行贷款更像政府拨款，而不像必须偿还的商业性债务。这一次，曾承诺到8月30日之前保持克制的离岸债权人，希望重组结果将更令人满意，其中部分原因至少是尚德拥有这么多可以被查封的、有价值的离岸资产。

But the dynamic in a China that is trying to change may be far more unpredictable than in the past where Chinese priorities and the heavy hand of the state were easier to anticipate.

但由于中国正努力进行变革，其发展态势可能比过去更难以预测。过去，中国的任务重点和政府的“铁拳”更容易预测出来。