US real assets are increasingly the only major game in town. Investors with global reach looking for security and return have few options as attractive, and none on the same scale. The world could soon see the kind of cash flow to the US that underpinned the late-1990s stock market boom, culminating in the tech bubble.

美国实物资产日益成为投资领域唯一的重头戏。在全球范围内寻找目标、同时追求安全与回报的投资者，很难找到吸引力与之相当的投资对象，而且其他投资对象的可选择范围也没那么广泛。世界可能不久就会看到大量资金涌向美国。20世纪90年代末就出现过类似情形，并且在美国制造了一轮股市繁荣，最终酿成科技泡沫。

Too much saving means too much investment for the world as a whole: no export surplus can serve as a safety valve, as it can for individual countries.

就整个世界而言，储蓄过高意味着投资也过高：出口顺差可以为个别国家提供安全阀，但不可能为全世界提供安全阀。

World savings were just under a quarter of gross world product last year, matching 2007’s record high ratio. But in 2007 the world’s baseline real interest rate – the inflation-adjusted yield of US 10-year Treasuries – was just under its long-run average of about 2.5 per cent. By 2012, the real 10-year Treasury yield was minus 0.5 per cent.

去年，世界储蓄占世界生产总值(gross world product)的比例略低于四分之一，与2007年的历史最高数值相当。但在2007年，世界基准实际利率——即经通胀调整的10年期美国国债收益率——略低于其约2.5%的长期平均值。而到了2012年，10年期国债实际收益率为-0.5%。

World investment necessarily equalled world saving, but was only spurred to that level in 2012 by a negative real cost of capital. This implies a negative risk-adjusted return on capital. Without that, world investment last year would have been lower, and with it growth, income, and therefore saving.

世界投资必然与世界储蓄相等，但在2012年是因为实际资金成本为负值，才刺激世界投资达到那么高的水平。这表明“风险调整资本回报率”为负值。否则的话，去年世界投资就会低一些，相应地，经济增长、收入和储蓄都会更低。

This year the real yield of 10-year US Treasuries has bounced to plus 0.5 per cent. Scarcely a huge hurdle rate for the return on capital, you might think. But already enough to stall the growth of US housing starts, and to tip some developing countries with trade deficits into restrictive policies. Meanwhile, the eurozone’s “recovery” has relapsed and Japan’s competitive devaluation scoops demand out of the rest of the world.

今年，10年期美国国债的实际收益率回升至+0.5%。你可能认为，这样的“最低预期资本回报率”并不算高，但已足以使美国新屋开建停止增长，并促使部分有贸易逆差的发展中国家实行紧缩性政策。同时，欧元区“复苏”再度受挫，而日本的竞争性贬值政策从其他国家手中抢走了需求。

Undervalued currencies

汇率低估

Most emerging markets have overvalued currencies. How do we know? Because the measured real exchange rates of most advanced countries are undervalued. The OECD’s measure of relative unit labour costs has the US undervalued by 15 per cent, the eurozone by 10 per cent, Japan by more than 20 per cent and Britain by nearly 20 per cent – all relative to the 1973-2012 post-Bretton-Woods average.

大多数新兴市场的汇率都被高估了。为什么这么说？因为大多数发达国家的实际汇率估测值都被低估了。经合组织(OECD)对相对单位劳动成本的估算将美国低估15%，欧元区低估10%，日本低估逾20%，英国低估近20%——对比基准都是1973年至2012年后“布雷顿森林”时期的平均值。

These advanced countries have three-fifths of the world’s GDP. But the world as a whole cannot be undervalued. So emerging markets are way overvalued, notably China, Russia and Brazil.

这些发达国家的国内生产总值(GDP)之和占世界GDP总量的五分之三。但世界作为一个整体，是不可能出现汇率低估的。所以，新兴市场特别是中国、俄罗斯和巴西的汇率被高估了。

While developing countries in deficit suffer as bond yields rise, those in surplus, heavily dependent on exports, face advanced country undervaluation. Their export-led growth model has used the US as the market of first resort. But this no longer works, with the US real exchange rate at the lowest level since the second world war, and its private and public borrowing now constrained.

尽管债券收益率上升使背负逆差的发展中国家受到冲击，但那些高度依赖出口的顺差型发展中国家，也面临发达国家汇率低估的问题。这些采用出口驱动型增长模式的发展中国家曾一直把美国作为首要出口市场。但如今，这个途径不管用了，因为美国实际汇率降至二战以来的最低水平，而且其私人和公共借贷也受到了抑制。

Meanwhile, the eurozone has its own, southern “submerging markets”. Spain has achieved some “internal devaluation”, but France, Belgium and Holland have drifted into “internal appreciation”. Germany looks convincingly cost-competitive – but needs it least. Germany’s exports, largely of capital goods, are traditionally price-insensitive. But their growth since 2007 has been largely to emerging markets, which are now themselves vulnerable. So relapse of the much ballyhooed eurozone recovery to near-stagnation could persist.

与此同时，欧元区也有自己的南方“沉没市场”。西班牙已实现了一定程度的“内部贬值”，但法国、比利时和荷兰却陷入了“内部升值”。德国可以说具有成本竞争力，但它是欧元区最不需要成本竞争力的国家。德国主要出口资本商品，通常对价格并不敏感。但德国自2007年以来出口出现增长的目的地主要在新兴市场，而如今新兴市场自身也很脆弱。所以，欧元区由媒体大肆宣传的复苏重新陷入停滞的可能性仍然存在。

Not only is European weakness a big change from the late-1990s – Japan is another. No longer in major recession, its escape depends heavily on competitive devaluation. Japanese investors, facing minimal interest rates and deliberate stimulus to inflation, have every reason to seek assets abroad.

跟20世纪90年代末相比，如今的重大变化不但有欧洲状况变差，日本也有很大变化。日本主要依靠竞争性贬值走出了严重衰退。由于日本政府把利率降得极低，并刻意推高通胀，日本投资者有充分的理由到海外寻找合适的资产。

Growth to accelerate

增长提速

When it comes to growth, the US is the world’s major positive story; and its companies are highly profitable, aided by undervaluation. Assuming federal budget disputes get resolved by late-winter, growth should accelerate to more than 3 per cent from next spring onwards.

在增长方面，美国的状况非常乐观，而得益于汇率低估，美国企业的盈利能力很强。假定到冬季结束时联邦预算纷争得到解决，从明年春天起，美国经济增速有望提高至3%以上。

This is hardly boom-time by late-1990s standards, but relatively restrained growth may postpone interest rate hikes, possibly also bond yields. Burgeoning energy output is cutting energy costs, enhancing undervaluation. It is hard to see how the dollar can avoid rising fast: inflation, already minimal, should be contained or even lowered.

若以20世纪90年代末的标准而论，这称不上繁荣状态，但相对缓慢的增速或许会推迟加息，也可能延缓债券收益率升高的趋势。能源产量猛增开始拉低能源价格，从而增强了汇率低估效果。很难看出，美元如何能避免快速升值：已经很低的通胀应该会受到抑制，甚至可能降得更低。

The other big change from the late-1990s concerns China. While the “tigers” that suffered the Asian crisis look stable now, China was protected by 30 per cent undervaluation in 1997-98 – but is 30 per cent overvalued now on Lombard Street Research’s estimates.

20世纪90年代末以来的另一个重大变化与中国有关。几只“虎”在经历亚洲危机之后，如今看上去很稳定，而1997年至1998年，中国由于汇率低估30%而安然无恙地挺过了危机，但据朗伯德街研究公司(Lombard Street Research)估算，中国汇率如今又被高估了30%。

Reforms announced recently included removal over the next few years of controls on private capital outflows. Chinese annual savings are about one-quarter of world savings. Its private investors are likely to prefer US real assets to almost anything else the world has to offer.

中国不久前宣布了多项改革措施，其中包括在未来几年内取消对私人资本流出的限制。中国每年的储蓄约为世界储蓄的四分之一。相比世界几乎其他所有资产，中国私人投资者可能更乐于投资美国实物资产。

Booming real estate, housing and stock market values could soon present the Federal Reserve with a painful choice between fostering growth and checking fresh bubbles.

房地产与住宅以及股票的不断升值，可能很快就会让美联储(Federal Reserve)面临艰难的抉择——到底是促进增长，还是遏制新泡沫。