In October, a train with 30 coal wagons left Ulan Bator destined for the Russian port of Vostochny, the first rail freight service to link the Mongolian capital with the Pacific coast. It took four days to travel the 4,769km.
Waved off by Russian and Mongolian dignitaries, the train was important because of where it did not go. The coal came from Tavan Tolgoi, a vast and largely untapped reserve in the South Gobi Desert, which also happens to be less than 200km from the border with China.
Landlocked and long ignored, Mongolia is using an instrument of 19th- century geopolitics – railway-building – as a means of navigating 21st-century globalisation.
The country is at one of the sweet spots of the global economy. It sits atop huge deposits of the commodities that China needs to fuel its growth.
Yet Mongolia is also one of the countries most unsettled by China’s rise. Having freed themselves from Soviet rule two decades ago, Mongolians fear they will be smothered by China. To avoid becoming captive to Chinese demand, Mongolia is planning an expensive rail network to link into Russia, its Pacific ports and, beyond that, to other Asian markets.
“The opportunity to go to an eastern Russian seaport provides us with some comfort,” says Sukhbaatar Batbold, Mongolia’s prime minister. “We want to create a balance of interests among the partners working with Mongolia.”
Mongolia’s insecurity is an acute version of the anxiety that is starting to be felt across Asia, and which could yet become a barrier to China-led integration of the region.
The dynamism of the Chinese economy has never been more attractive in Asia. China’s urbanisation plans and growing consumer market are likely to make it the anchor of the regional economy for several decades to come.
Yet amid signs that China is more determined to flex its diplomatic muscles, Mongolia is not the only Asian nation worried about being pushed around. South Korea, Japan and Vietnam have all strengthened military ties with the US over the past year.
As well as Tavan Tolgoi, southern Mongolia also boasts Oyu Tolgoi, a huge deposit of copper and gold. Even before these mega-mines begin production in earnest, China is already taking 70 per cent of Mongolia’s exports.
With only one railway line crossing the Chinese border, some of this trade must go by truck along precarious roads. A private company had been planning to build a short rail link running south from Tavan Tolgoi to China. Instead, Mongolia’s parliament approved a very different plan – a 1,500km rail link to the north-east, where it will connect with Russia’s Trans-Siberian network. New lines to China are still planned, but priority has been given to the Russian connection.
As Elbegdorj Tsakhia, Mongolia’s president, puts it: “We need more doors to our neighbours.”
In a symbolic touch, the new track will use the Russian 1,520mm gauge, rather than the smaller standard used in China and elsewhere. (Russia also has a 50 per cent stake in the Mongolian rail network.) Trains to China will need to pause at the border for the cargo to change chassis – an operation that can take hours.
The plan has been criticised by external experts. The World Bank estimates it costs three times as much to transport resources from the new mines to Russia than it does to China, while profit margins on exporting to the rest of Asia via a Russian port could be less than a 10th of those earned by transit through China.
But supporters of the Russia rail project point to Beijing’s treatment of the one rail line already linking China and Mongolia. Mongolia’s dominant religion is similar to Tibetan Buddhism. When the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader loathed in Beijing, visited Ulan Bator in 2002, Chinese authorities closed the rail link for more than a day, stranding passengers.
The rail link to Russia is part of a broader industrial strategy. It goes through Sainshand, a city where the government wants to build a copper smelter and oil refinery as part of a push to retain more of the economic value from its resources.
“China’s growth brings us a huge chance to develop and prosper,” says Sanjaasuren Oyun, a former foreign minister. “But we do not want to simply become the raw material supplier to just one country.”
While Soviet policies caused huge devastation to Mongolian society, Mongolians also remember centuries of conflict with China. The instinct to play the two giants off against each other is deeply ingrained.
“Mongolian society has a sense of cultural alienation from China and fears that growing economic dependence on its powerful neighbour might evolve into political subservience,” says Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Ulan Bator. “This outweighs all rational calculations of the immediate economic benefit and dwarfs any advice or opinion of western experts.”
Yet while Mongolia is fixated on the perceived threat from China, the country of just 3m people spends just as much time discussing how it will spend all the money from its China- related boom.
Ulan Bator has become one of the many mining boomtowns spawned by Chinese demand. Construction cranes dominate the skyline.
Before the financial crisis, Mongolia went through its own form of resource populism. As western societies became obsessed with rising house prices, Mongolians tracked the soaring copper price. Mongolia’s two main parties outbid each other to award cash payments from future mining revenue: when one offered each citizen $800, the other offered $1,200. “There is an old saying about dividing the skin of a bear before it has been hunted down,” says Ms Oyun.
When the crisis caused commodity prices to slump, Mongolia found itself facing a budget shortfall and a humbling visit to the International Monetary Fund for a $232m loan, which has now been repaid.
Since the crisis, a coalition government comprising the two main parties has pushed through two important reforms designed to control rash spending of its commodity dividend. Based on the experience of Chile, a fiscal stabilisation fund will set aside money for long-term development.
The economy will also have to navigate the capital inflows that will start from 2013, when operations at the two large mines in the south start to ramp up. The central bank is trying to develop tools to prevent sharp currency appreciation, which could damage non-mining sectors. As Lhanaasuren Purevdorj, governor of the central bank, says: “Our currency war begins in 2013.”
去年10月，一趟拉着30车皮煤炭的列车离开乌兰巴托驶向俄罗斯的东方港。这是连接蒙古国首都与太平洋沿岸的首趟铁路货运列车，全程需时4天，行程4769公里。
俄蒙两国达官显要送别的这趟列车之重要性体现在，它没有驶向中国。列车上拉的煤来自塔班陶勒盖(Tavan Tolgoi)，南戈壁沙漠一座基本上未开发的巨型煤矿藏，恰巧距蒙中边境不到200公里。
身处内陆、长期为世人所忽视的蒙古，正借用19世纪的地缘政治工具——铁路建设——航行在21世纪的全球化潮流中。
蒙古可谓全球经济的“风水宝地”之一。该国坐拥大量矿藏，而中国正需要这些矿藏为本国经济增长提供动力。
但蒙古也是对中国崛起最感不安的国家之一。20年前摆脱前苏联统治的蒙古，担心自己会受到中国的钳制。为避免受制于中国需求，蒙古正计划修建一个耗资巨大的铁路网，把本国与俄罗斯、俄在太平洋沿岸的港口、乃至其它亚洲市场连接起来。
蒙古总理苏赫巴托尔?巴特包勒德(Sukhbaatar Batbold)表示：“连接俄罗斯东部海港的机会让我们稍稍放下了心。我们希望在蒙古的各伙伴国间建立一种利益平衡。”
蒙古的不安全感尖锐地反映出亚洲各国开始感受到的焦虑，这种焦虑可能会阻碍中国引领的亚洲一体化进程。
在亚洲，中国经济的活力从未像现在这样有吸引力。中国的城市化计划和日趋壮大的消费市场，很可能会让该国在未来几十年里成为亚洲经济的支柱。
但在种种迹象表明中国正更加坚定地舒展外交肌肉之际，蒙古并非唯一担心被中国欺负的亚洲国家。过去一年里，韩国、日本和越南都与美国加强了军事关系。
除了塔班陶勒盖，蒙古南部还有一座巨型铜金矿——奥尤陶勒盖(Oyu Tolgoi)。甚至在这些巨型矿藏尚未正式投产的今天，中国就已经占到蒙古出口总额的70%。
由于只有一条铁路线跨越蒙中边境，两国间的部分贸易只得借助在危险公路上行驶的卡车来完成。一家私营公司一直计划修一条自塔班陶勒盖向南连至中国的短途铁路线。但蒙古议会却批准了一项截然不同的计划：一条通向蒙古东北的1500公里长的铁路线，与俄罗斯的跨西伯利亚铁路连接起来。连至中国的新铁路线仍在计划当中，但优先任务是修建“连俄线”。
正如蒙古总统查希亚?额勒贝格道尔吉(Elbegdorj Tsakhia)所言：“我们需要更多通向邻国的大门。”
一个具有象征意义的细节是，新铁路将使用俄制1520毫米轨距，而不是中国和其它国家所使用的较窄的标准轨距。（俄罗斯还拥有蒙古国铁路网50%的股份。）蒙古驶向中国的列车必须先在边境停下，待车厢更换完底盘后再驶入中国——这一操作可耗时数小时。
这项计划受到了外界专家的批评。世界银行(World Bank)估计，把资源从新矿运至俄罗斯的时间是运至中国的3倍，而经由俄罗斯港口把资源出口至亚洲其它地区的利润率可能不到经由中国出口的十分之一。
但“连俄线”项目的支持者提到一点，即北京方面对待现已连接中蒙两国的那条铁路的态度。蒙古占主导地位的宗教是藏传佛教。2002年，当北京方面所反感的西藏流亡精神领袖**喇嘛访问乌兰巴托时，中国当局把那条铁路关闭了一天多，导致大量旅客滞留。
“连俄线”还是蒙古工业战略的组成部分。蒙古政府希望在该线途经的赛音山达市兴建一座炼铜厂和一座炼油厂，力图让蒙古从本国资源中获取更多经济价值。
蒙古前外交部长桑加苏伦?奥云(Sanjaasuren Oyun)表示：“中国的经济增长给我们带来了发展和繁荣的巨大机会。但我们不想仅仅成为只面向一个国家的原材料供应国。”
前苏联的政策对蒙古社会造成了巨大破坏，但蒙古人也没有忘记与中国长达数个世纪的冲突。挑动俄中两个大国鹬蚌相争，是蒙古人根深蒂固的本能。
乌兰巴托战略研究所研究员Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder表示：“蒙古社会与中国有一种文化疏远感，担心蒙古对强大邻国日益增强的经济依赖会导致在政治方面陷于从属地位。所有关于眼前经济利益的理性考虑，以及西方专家提出的任何建议和见解，在这一担心面前都不值一提。”
但蒙古在执着于它所感觉到的中国威胁的同时，这个仅有300万人口的国家也在耗费同样多的时间来讨论如何花掉经济繁荣带来的财富，而蒙古的经济繁荣恰恰与中国有关。
乌兰巴托已成为由中国需求造就的众多矿业新兴城市之一。放眼望去，该市的天际线上到处都是建筑起重机。
金融危机前，蒙古经历了自身形式的资源民粹主义。在西方社会痴迷于房价不断上涨之际，蒙古人则紧盯着日益飙升的铜价。蒙古两个主要政党许诺用未来矿业收入向民众发放的现金一个比一个高：一个政党许愿向每位公民发放800美元现金时，另一个政党就许愿发放1200美元。奥云说：“有一句老话叫作还没捕到熊就开始分熊皮了。”
后来，金融危机导致大宗商品价格暴跌，蒙古发现自身出现了预算缺口，不得不低头请求国际货币基金组织(IMF)向其提供2.32亿美元贷款——蒙古现在已经偿清了这笔贷款。
自金融危机爆发以来，蒙古由两个主要政党组成的联合政府已推行了两项重要改革，目的是控制大肆挥霍其大宗商品红利的行为。蒙古根据智利的经验建立了一只财政稳定基金，将拨出资金用于本国长期发展。
蒙古经济还必须想办法应对将于2013年开始的资本流入——届时，蒙古南部两大矿藏的生产将开始加速。蒙古央行正设法开发相关工具，防止本币大幅升值，以免损害到非矿业部门。正如该行行长普日布道尔吉(Lhanaasuren Purevdorj)所言：“我们的汇率战争将在2013年打响。” |
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