WATCHING Europe flirt with financial catastrophe has not erased memories in Asia of the region’s own meltdown 15 years ago. Indeed, it has served as a reminder of the dangers lurking out there. So the effort to build regional financial defences carries on, albeit at the snail’s pace typical of Asian multilateral diplomacy. Bold talk of an “Asian Monetary Fund” has yielded something more modest, called, with that also-typical flair for catchy nomenclature, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM). This is an agreement among the ten members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), plus China, Japan and South Korea, to come to each other’s aid in a liquidity crisis. It is an impressive achievement in regional co-operation by the so-called ASEAN+3, and in March took a big step forward. Whether it is of any practical use remains an open question.

目睹欧洲深陷金融灾难并未抹去亚洲十五年前自己遭受危机时的记忆。事实上，它作为一个警钟提醒他们远离危险。于是构筑区域金融防御工事的努力付诸实施，尽管是以亚洲多边外交中典型的蜗牛速度行进。关于“亚洲货币基金组织”的大胆讨论已经取得了一些小成果——清迈倡议多边化，在此亚洲人在命名方面典型的天赋再次展露。这是东盟十国与中日韩三国之间的协议，在流动性危机中借此相互扶持。这是所谓的东盟10+3在区域合作中取得的一大成就，并于三月份再进一步。它是否具备任何实际用途犹未可知。

The impetus for all this was the deep anger the IMF generated with its handling of the 1997-98 bail-outs. The austerity it imposed was seen as ineffective as well as painful, and entry into an IMF programme as carrying a humiliating stigma. The analysis may be unfair. But one 1998 photograph summed up a regional perception of IMF high-handedness. It showed its boss at the time, Michel Camdessus, standing with his arms folded, watching the late Suharto, Indonesia’s soon-to-be-deposed president, sign what might have been an unconditional surrender. Add “cultural insensitivity” to the charge sheet.

这一切的动力源自他们对国际货币基金组织1997至1998年纾困亚洲金融危机处理方式的极度愤慨。它采取的紧缩政策被视作无效且痛苦的，而且是一个认作是一个承载着耻辱的IMF项目。这种分析可能不尽公平。但1998年的一张照片很好地归结了该区域对IMF霸道作风的一个看法。照片中显示那时IMF的总裁米歇尔?康德苏双手抱胸站着，看着当时即将被迫下台的已故总统苏哈托签署好似无条件投降的协议。控罪书还多了“文化不敏感”这一条。

In an effort to demonstrate Asian solidarity, a hunt was instigated for a regional alternative to the fund. The enthusiasm, however, soon collided with two big obstacles. First, the scale of the rescues needed in 1997-98 by Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia seemed vast at the time, even if they have since been dwarfed in subsequent (non-Asian) crises. Second, the basis of Asian regionalism has been non-interference in each other’s affairs. Governments would resent being told by their neighbours to put their economic houses in order.

为显示亚洲的团结，一帮人受此刺激寻求一个区域组织代替国际货币基金组织。然而，这股热情很快遭遇了两大阻碍。首先，1997至1998年间泰国、韩国、印度尼西亚所需的援助规模在那时看起来是巨大的，虽然他们和随后而来的危机（亚洲区外）相比相形见绌。其次，亚洲本土主义准则一向是不干涉他国事务。当一国政府被其邻国告知，要管好自家经济，他们将会感到愤怒。

The first go at co-operation, the Chiang Mai Initiative of 2000, was to expand and formalise a network of bilateral swap agreements between central banks, under which they promised to provide each other with liquidity. This was accompanied by a “dialogue” on economic policy, which, as one participant puts it, amounted at best to no more than information-sharing, at worst to a “beauty contest”, with a lot of cosmetic data-enhancement.

2000年的清迈倡议下的第一项合作成果便是各国央行将双边货币互换协议网络扩大，并且定制化，在此协议之下，他们承诺相互间提供流动性支持。这项协议还伴随着一个有关经济政策的“对话”，该“对话”，如其中一位与会者称，最乐观的估计也不过是信息分享，而最差的情况就是成为一个“选美比赛”，包括了许多修饰性的数据加强。

In 2010 the 13 countries “multilateralised” the CMI, ie, turned it into a formal arrangement binding them all. Because the money remains in the individual central banks, the CMIM is a set of promises not a fund. They also agreed to set up the ASEAN+3 Macro-economic Research Office (AMRO). This opened the following year in Singapore. Its director is Wei Benhua, a veteran of China’s central bank. It is charged with providing quarterly “surveillance” reports on member-country economies, as an early-warning system, as well as being ready to respond to a crisis with rapid analysis. The size of the CMIM is $120 billion. But Mr Wei says that, at a meeting in Phnom Penh in late March, it was agreed that this will be doubled.

2010年，13国“多边化”了清迈倡议，即，变成了一个对所有国家有约束力的正式协定。因为资金尚在各自的中央银行，所以清迈倡议多边化还只是一系列承诺而非一个基金组织。13国还同意建立东盟10+3宏观经济研究办公室。该办公室于2011年在新加坡成立，研究室主任为魏本华，他是中国央行的资深人士。它还担负着向成员国经济状况提供季度“监测”报告，作为一个早期的预警系统，还包括为危机而随时准备的快速分析。清迈倡议多边化的规模为1,200亿美元。但魏本华称，3月下旬在金边的一个会议已经同意将规模扩大一倍。

These days, even $240 billion is not very much—one reason for doubting the CMIM’s value. Neither it nor the CMI has ever been used. South Korea did turn to China and Japan (as well as America) for help during the global crisis of late 2008, but it arranged direct swap lines with their central banks. More than the money itself, the credibility offered by the backing of such countries helped steady things. Mr Wei points out that Asia is building defences “in peacetime”. That is commendable, but it does not ensure they are strong enough. Each CMIM country has access to the amount it has committed times a multiple (five for poor countries, 2.5 for the better-off ASEAN members, one for South Korea and 0.5 for China and Japan).

现如今，即使2,400亿美元也不算很多——这是质疑清迈倡议多边化价值的一个原因。不管是清迈倡议多边化还是清迈倡议都未曾发挥作用。2008年末全球金融危机期间，韩国求助于中国和日本（也包括美国），但清迈倡议多边化只是安排韩国与其他国家央行的直接货币互换。相较于资金本身，更多的是这些撑它的国家所提供的信誉帮助稳定住了局势。魏本华指出亚洲正在“和平时期”构筑防御工事。这是值得称颂的，但它并不能确保他们足够强大。每个清迈倡议多边化成员国可获得它承诺的出资份额乘以一个借款乘数（贫困国家借款乘数为5，经济条件稍好的东盟成员国为2.5，韩国为1，中国和日本为0.5）。

So for Thailand and Indonesia, for example, $11.4 billion is available. Compare that with their respective bail-outs in 1997 and 1998 of $17.2 billion and $42.3 billion (equivalent, in 2012 dollars, to $24.4 billion and $59.1 billion). Or compare it with Europe’s bail-out funds, worth several hundred billion dollars and still criticised for being too small. And the research office itself is tiny—just 12 economists, to be increased, Mr Wei hopes, to 16.

所以，例如泰国和印度尼西亚能获得114亿美元的资金。对比他们在亚洲金融危机中各自所需的172亿美元和423亿美元（相当于现在的244亿美元和591亿美元）。又或者对比欧洲价值几千亿美元的纾困资金，而且还被批数额太小。研究办公室本身也小——只有12位经济学家，魏本华希望能扩充到16位。

That helps explain another obstacle to use of the CMIM. Born of frustration with the IMF, it remains linked to the fund’s conditions. Unless a country subjects itself to an IMF programme, it may draw on only 20% of the available liquidity from other central banks. The proportion will be increased, but only to 30% this year and 40% from 2014. Countries that see themselves as potential crisis-victims want to shake off the fund’s shackles. Potential creditors find them rather comforting.

这也有助于解释使用清迈倡议多边化的另一大阻碍。出于对国际货币基金组织的失望应运而生的清迈倡议多边化依旧与IMF资金使用条件有联系。除非一国将自身放到一个IMF项目，否则它只可能从他国央行得到20%的可用流动性资金。这一比例将会增加，但今年只会增至30%，2014年提到40%。那些将自己视作潜在的危机受害国想要摆脱IMF的束缚。潜在的债权人看到他们应该相当欣慰。

Thirdly, the fast-growing regional interdependence may seem to demand a regional financial-crisis response. But the more interlinked the region, the greater the risk of contagion and of neighbours’ inability to help each other. In 1997 South Korea promised to contribute to Thailand’s bail-out. A few months later it had to withdraw as the financial crisis engulfed it.

第三，快速增长的区域相互依赖看起来可能需要一个区域金融危机反映机制。但区域内联系越紧密，危机传染扩散的风险越大，邻国无力相互帮助的风险也越大。1997年，韩国承诺帮助泰国纾困。几个月后，它不得不退出，因为金融危机也席卷了韩国。

A fitter fund?The idea of an Asian Monetary Fund has not gone away, but even its proponents now see it as a distant dream, and as a supplement rather than an alternative to the IMF. So enhanced regional co-operation may matter less than the effort to reform the fund itself. Also at the end of March, the five big emerging-market economies—the BRICS, including India and China—met in Delhi. They complained that a 2010 reform of the IMF giving developing-country members a greater weight is being implemented too slowly, and threatened to withhold the increased financing the IMF has asked for to cope with Europe’s needs. Since 1997-98, the balance of financial power has shifted in emerging markets’ and Asia’s favour. Asia cannot beat the IMF; maybe it can change it.

亚洲货币基金组织的想法并未消失，但即使是其支持者现在也将其视作一个遥远的梦想，而且更多地是将其视作IMF的一个补充而非替代。所以加强区域合作可能并没有努力改革IMF本身来得紧要。同样在3月末，五大新兴市场经济体——金砖五国，包括中印——在德里举行了会谈。他们抱怨2010年IMF给予发展中国家成员国更大的权重的改革进行得太慢，并威胁拒绝支付IMF要求增加的以应付欧洲需求的融资。自1997-98年来，金融权力的平衡已经转向了新兴市场和亚洲。亚洲不可能击败IMF；但没准没改变它。