Britain is locked in a sterile argument concerning the lack of credit on offer to companies. The Bank of England argues that weak banks do not lend, so they need more capital. The industry counters that tighter regulation kills risk-taking and lending. But both sides agree that shovelling money out of the banks’ doors is important for economic recovery. Sad to say, neither of the positions, nor the inferred causal link between lending and recovery, is necessarily correct. 面对着企业信贷供应不足的问题，英国陷入了一场毫无结果的争论。英国央行(BoE)认为境况不佳的银行放不出贷款，因此它们需要更多的资本。银行业反驳道，严格的监管扼杀冒险和贷款。不过，双方均认同银行放贷对于经济复苏的重要意义。但说来遗憾的是，双方各自坚持的观点以及贷款与复苏之间的因果关系都不一定成立。

The BoE has been unwavering in its insistence that weak lending results from banks having too little capital – the money reserved to ensure they can absorb losses. The minutes of the most recent Financial Policy Committee meeting note: “It was striking that better-capitalised UK banks had been expanding lending to the real economy since mid-2012 while other institutions had been contracting lending”. 英国央行坚定认为，银行贷款疲软的原因是银行资本过少——资本即是保证银行能够消化损失的储备金。英国金融政策委员会(Financial Policy Committee, FPC)最近一次会议的纪要提到：“令人瞩目的是，自2012年中期以来，资本状况较好的英国银行增加了向实体经济发放的贷款，而其他银行则减少了贷款发放。”

In the long run, the central bank’s position is correct. Capital is not money locked away that cannot be lent to profitable ventures. It gives the institution the ability to withstand losses without recourse to other parties, including bondholders, depositors and taxpayers. So lower capital buffers make a bank more risky and will frighten some depositors and investors into demanding higher returns, restricting the funds available to lend. 长期来看，央行的观点是正确的。资本并不是锁在保险箱里、不能借给有能力赚钱的企业的资金。它让银行能够在不求助债券持有者、储户和纳税人的情况下承受住损失。因此，如果资本“缓冲层”较为薄弱，将增加银行的风险，受惊的储户和投资者将要求获得更高的回报率，从而限制用于发放贷款的资金。

But the BoE position ignores short-run dynamics. It regulates the “capital ratio”: the amount of loss-absorbing funds compared with the assets of the bank. The FPC’s insistence that banks’ ratios hit a 7 per cent target by the end of the year is achievable in two ways – banks can raise capital as the BoE wants; or they can cut assets and lending, as many of the banks plan to do. Though the FPC uses its voice in calling for the former, its actions will give many UK banks more of an incentive to cut lending. 但英国央行的观点忽视了短期动态。它规定了“资本比率”，即可用于吸收损失的资金与银行资产之比。金融政策委员会要求各银行在今年年底之前达到7%的资本比率目标，这一目标可通过两种方式实现：一是按照英国央行的想法增加资本，二是削减资产和贷款——后者才是多家银行计划实施的方案。尽管金融政策委员会大力呼吁银行采取前一种手段，但其行为却助长了英国多家银行减少发放贷款的倾向。

With disappointing business investment over the past two years, everyone seems to agree that weak lending, particularly for small companies, is a disaster. Vince Cable, business secretary, argues banks are disproportionately restricting credit to small companies. The business department believes that the provision of more finance to small and medium-sized companies is crucial to the recovery the and long-term growth of the UK economy. 过去两年，英国企业投资状况不尽如人意，贷款疲软的危害（尤其是对小企业）似乎已成为共识。商务大臣文斯•凯布尔(Vince Cable)认为，银行过分限制了面向小企业的信贷。英国商务部认为，向中小企业提供更多融资对英国经济的复苏和长期增长至关重要。

Here a sense of perspective and history, rather than rhetoric, is required. The total stock of loans to small and medium-sized companies stands at £100bn, and is dwarfed by the £475bn lent to larger companies. Middle-sized businesses with fewer than 250 employees account for only 38 per cent of business investment; and small companies with up to nine employees, less than a tenth. Since finance for large companies is not seriously constrained, only a very small part of the growth shortfall can be blamed on credit restrictions to small companies. Moreover, Britain has enjoyed economic recoveries alongside falling or stagnant business lending in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 在这个问题上，需要的是明辨主次和以史为鉴，而不是夸夸其谈。发放给中小企业的贷款总计为1000亿英镑，远不及发放给大企业的4750亿英镑。雇员低于250人的中型企业仅占企业总投资的38%；低于9人（含）的小企业只占不到十分之一。鉴于大企业融资没有受到真正的约束，因此经济增长不足很难归咎于小企业信贷受限。此外，在20世纪70年代、80年代和90年代，英国曾在企业贷款降低或停滞的情况下实现过经济复苏。

We need to start afresh with our arguments over credit, bank lending and the recovery. Instead of asserting the primacy of lending to economic fortunes, we need to show there is a causal link. If there is one, the FPC should then question its insistence on higher capital ratios this year, since the move will encourage banks to lend less. 我们需要重新讨论信贷、银行贷款和复苏的关系。我们不应断言贷款对经济前途的决定性意义，而是需要证明两者之间的因果关系。如果因果关系确实存在，金融政策委员会需要反思它今年要求提高银行资本比率的决定，因为此举会导致银行减少放贷。

Indeed, the BoE wants the moral authority to use counter-cyclical capital rules, which will force banks to raise capital ratios during booms to soak up credit floods and cut them during slumps to mitigate droughts. But raising capital ratios when the rain refuses to fall is not the obvious first step. 其实，英国央行缺乏使用反周期资本规则的道德权威。反周期资本规则可迫使银行在繁荣时期提高资本比率，吸收多余信贷，在衰退时期降低资本比率，缓解信贷枯竭。但在枯竭期提高资本比率绝不是明智的第一步。

Policies such as the creation of the government’s new business bank or extending the funding for lending scheme can be helpful, but must be recognised as secondary in this process. Giving even more cheap funding to banks that have behaved well so far in lending to small companies might be sensible, but we should not expect a miraculous increase in the total quantity of lending nor of business investment. 诸如政府新成立商业银行或扩大“贷款融资计划”(Funding for Lending)等政策可能有帮助，但在解决这一问题的过程中必须被视为次要措施。目前一些银行在向小企业发放贷款方面做得不错，为它们提供更多低息资金或许是明智之举，但我们不应指望贷款总量或商业投资出现奇迹般的增长。

As so often in public debates, the link between the policy process and evidence is broken. Encouraging business lending involves a difficult short-term trade-off between the safety of banks and their willingness to lend. But even if the authorities chose the optimal point on that trade-off, the result is unlikely to offer the magic key to unlock recovery. 正如公共辩论中经常遇到的情形一样，政策决策过程与证据脱节。鼓励银行向企业发放贷款，需要在银行安全和银行贷款意愿之间做出短期权衡。但当局即便能找出最佳平衡点，也将难以打开促进复苏的魔力之门。