SAN FRANCISCO, Jul 3 (Reuters) - Silicon Valley has tried to distance itself from the controversial U.S. surveillance programs exposed by Edward Snowden, but there is a long history of close cooperation between technology companies and the intelligence community.

路透社旧金山7月3日 - 硅谷试图拉开与斯诺登所披露的美国监控项目的距离，但是科技企业与情报机构之间的紧密合作由来已久。

Former U.S. officials and intelligence sources say the collaboration between the tech industry and spy agencies is both broader and deeper than most people realize, dating back to the formative years of Silicon Valley itself.

前美国官员和情报消息人士称，科技行业和情报机构间的合作比大多数人认识到的更加广泛和深入，并且能追溯到硅谷成立的年代。

As U.S. intelligence agencies accelerate efforts to acquire new technology and fund research on cybersecurity, they have invested in start-up companies, encouraged firms to put more military and intelligence veterans on company boards, and nurtured a broad network of personal relationships with top technology executives.

美国情报机构加大获取新技术的努力，并为网络安全研究提供资金，他们投资了创业企业，鼓励企业任命更多退伍兵和前情报人员进入董事会，并与大型科技企业高管建立了广泛的个人关系网络。

And they are using those connections to carry out specific espionage missions, current and former officials say, even as they work with the tech industry to avoid overt cooperation that might raise the hackles of foreign customers.

官员们称，情报机构利用这些关系开展间谍任务，同时与科技行业共同努力避免合作招致外国客户的愤怒。

Joel Harding, an intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1990s who went on to work at big defense contractors Computer Sciences Corp and SAIC, said spy agencies have at times persuaded companies to alter their hardware and software products to enable monitoring of foreign targets.

Joel Harding在20世纪90年代是美国参谋长联席会议的一名情报人员，后来前往大型国防承包商Computer Sciences Corp(CSC.N: 行情)和SAIC(SAI.N: 行情)工作。Harding指出，情报机构有时能说服企业更改他们的硬件和软件产品，从而对外国目标进行监控。

In one instance several years ago, an intelligence agency paid a tech company supervisor $50,000 to install tampered computer chips in machines bound for a customer in a foreign country so that they could be used for espionage, Harding said, declining to provide specifics. "They looked exactly the same, but they changed the chips," he said.

Harding称，几年前，一家情报机构向一家科技企业的主管支付了5万美元，在卖给一个外国客户的机器中安装修改过的电脑芯片，从而进行间谍活动。“那些机器看起来和原来一模一样，但是芯片被更换。”

A current U.S. intelligence operative, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the government often works through third parties, in part to shield the big tech companies from fallout if the operations are discovered.

一名现役美国情报人员匿名称，政府经常通过第三方操作，部分原因是一旦行动败露，能够防止大型科技企业受到冲击。

He cited a case more than a decade ago in which the government secretly created a computer reselling company to sell laptops to Asian governments. The reseller bought laptops from a company called Tadpole Computer, which made machines based on Sun Microsystems processors. The reseller added secret software that allowed intelligence analysts to access the machines remotely.

他提到了10多年前的一件事，政府秘密创建了一家转售电脑的企业，向亚洲政府销售笔记本电脑。该企业从一家名叫Tadpole Computer的企业购买笔记本，Tadpole生产的笔记本基于Sun Microsystems处理器。这家转售电脑的企业安装了秘密软件，使情报人员可以远程登录这些机器。

Tadpole was later bought by defense contractor General Dynamics Corp in 2005. General Dynamics declined to comment. Sun's new owner, Oracle Corp, did not respond to an inquiry.

Tadpole于2005年被国防承包商General Dynamics Corp收购，而Sun则被甲骨文公司收购。General Dynamics和甲骨文都拒绝置评。

Despite these secret collaborations, former intelligence officials and company executives say the great fear of overseas customers — that widely used U.S. technology products contain a "back door" accessible only to the National Security Agency or Central Intelligence Agency - is exaggerated. They said computers and communications overseas are captured by other means, including third parties such as the laptop reseller and special software developed by the agencies.

前情报官员和公司高管们称，虽然有这些秘密合作，但海外客户对美国科技产品包含只有美国国家安全局或美国中央情报局能够使用的“后门”的担忧是夸大的。他们表示，入侵电脑和海外通信是通过其他方法，包括上述笔记本电脑转售商等第三方机构和情报机构开发的特殊软件等。

Defense contractors offer the government the means to break in to the products of virtually every major software vendor, according to a product catalogue reviewed by Reuters that was described as typical for the industry. [ID:nL2N0DQ35M] The NSA did not respond to a request for comment.

路透社获得的一个被称为行业典型的产品目录显示，国防承包商向政府提供破解几乎所有主流软件提供商产品的方法。美国国家安全局拒绝置评。

More massive cooperation is rare because big tech companies sell to many countries and have too much business at stake in markets like China to risk installing a back door that could be discovered, said one intelligence veteran who had worked for Microsoft Corp.

一名曾在微软工作的前情报人员称，更大规模的合作很少见，因为大型科技企业面向很多国家销售，安装可能被发现的后门会让在中国等市场的太多业务处于危险中。

"Microsoft is technically a U.S. company, but it's an international conglomerate with tons of subsidiaries," he said. "It's a major part of Microsoft strategy to sell to China." A spokeswoman for the company declined to comment.

“微软技术上说是一家美国公司，但其实是一家国际性企业集团，拥有很多子公司，向中国销售是微软战略的一个主要部分，”该人士说道。微软发言人拒绝置评。