The words freedom and democracy seem to be yoked together – like gin and tonic or Laurel and Hardy. In the rhetoric of many western politicians, the two words are used almost interchangeably. Promoting his “freedom agenda” in 2003, President George W Bush hailed the “swiftest advance for freedom in the 2,500-year story of democracy”.

自由和民主这两个词似乎已被捆绑在了一起，就像杜松子酒与奎宁水、劳莱(Laurel)与哈代(Hardy)一样。在许多西方政界人士口中，这两个词几乎是可以互换使用的。2003年，时任美国总统的小布什(George W Bush)在宣扬其“自由议程”时，称赞了“2500年民主发展历程中自由取得的最迅猛进展。”

But the current political upheavals in Egypt show that freedom and democracy are not always the same thing. They can sometimes be enemies. Egyptian liberals who backed the military coup against President Mohamed Morsi justified their actions because they believed that the Muslim Brotherhood government, although elected, was threatening fundamental freedoms.

但埃及当前的政治动荡表明，自由与民主并非总是一回事。有时，两者可能互为敌人。埃及自由派人士之所以支持军方发动反对总统穆罕默德•穆尔西(Mohamed Morsi)的政变，是因为他们相信，尽管穆斯林兄弟会(Muslim Brotherhood)领导的政府是民选政府，但它正在对基本的自由构成威胁。

It is true that queues for petrol, the rising price of food and the sense that security was breaking down in Egypt were crucial in bringing millions of anti-Morsi demonstrators on to the streets.

埃及人为加油而不得不排长队，食品价格不断上涨，国内安全形势似乎日趋恶化，这些诚然都是促使数百万人走上街头举行反穆尔西示威的关键原因。

But it is also true that key members of the Egyptian liberal movement were enthusiastic supporters of the ouster of an elected government. The liberals argued that Mr Morsi and the Brotherhood were riding roughshod over the courts, intimidating the media, failing to protect the rights of women and minorities, and introducing an increasingly Islamist tone to public life – with the promise of more to come. The fear was that the very democratic freedoms that had given the Muslim Brotherhood its chance could not be guaranteed under the rule of a party that ultimately believes that it gets its instructions and authority from God – not the voters.

但是，埃及自由运动的关键成员狂热支持罢黜一个民选政府，这也是实情。自由派辩称，穆尔西与穆兄会践踏法庭的权威，恫吓媒体，未能保护妇女与少数族群的权利，还不断向公共生活中添加伊斯兰主义因素——未来很可能还有更多类似的做法。令人担心的是，穆兄会靠着民主自由上台后，民主自由在这个政党的统治下反而得不到保障，因为该党从心底里信奉的是，他们只能从真主而不是选民那里获得指示和权威。

The Egyptian problem is not unique. In Turkey, secular liberals have been demonstrating against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development party, or AKP. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, Mr Erdogan can point to a record of solid, economic success. And yet some of the complaints of the Istanbul demonstrators are similar to those heard in Cairo. They accuse the Turkish government of eroding civil liberties, undermining the courts, intimidating journalists and supporting a creeping Islamisation that threatens the freedoms of secular Turks – whether it is the right to drink beer or to dress “immodestly”.

存在同样问题的并非只有埃及。在土耳其，世俗的自由派人士一直在向雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)领导下的政府与“正义与发展党”(Justice and Development party)发出抗议。与穆兄会不同的是，埃尔多安还有扎实的经济成就可以依仗。不过，伊斯坦布尔示威者的部分抱怨与埃及街头的声音没有多大区别。他们指责土耳其政府侵害公民自由、削弱法庭权威、恫吓记者并支持暗中进行的伊斯兰化，这种伊斯兰化对世俗派土耳其人的自由构成了威胁——无论这种自由指的是喝啤酒的权利，还是着装“轻佻”的权利。

Like the Brotherhood, the AKP in Turkey has responded to the complaints of liberals by pointing to its electoral mandate.

与穆兄会一样，土耳其正发党也对自由派人士的抱怨作出了回应，称自己的权力是选民授予的。

It is tempting for outsiders to assume that this clash between democracy and freedom is a problem unique to Muslim countries with Islamist political parties. But that is not true. In Sri Lanka at the moment, an elected government is busily undermining the independence of the courts and the freedom of the press. And, in recent years, popular demonstrations against the illiberal acts of an elected government have also been witnessed in Moscow and in Bangkok.

外界人士倾向于认为，民主与自由之间的这种冲突，是国内有伊斯兰主义政党的穆斯林国家所特有的问题。但这不是事实。眼下，斯里兰卡的民选政府也正忙于破坏法庭的独立性和新闻自由。此外，近年来，莫斯科和曼谷的民众也多次发起了反对民选政府限制自由的示威活动。

In Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Egypt part of the problem seems to be the gap between a relatively affluent and educated urban elite that finds itself outvoted by the rest of the country – albeit with some ballot-rigging in the Russian case. Once in power, an elected populist with authoritarian instincts – such as President Vladimir Putin or Mr Erdogan – can trample on freedoms cherished by the urban middle-classes, while appealing to the “real” nation, out in the small towns or countryside.

在俄罗斯、泰国、土耳其和埃及，这个问题的部分根源似乎在于：相对富足、受教育程度较高的城市精英阶层发现自己在选票数量上敌不过国内其他群体，因此心理上产生了落差——当然就俄罗斯的情况而言，里面还存在一定程度的选举操纵。一旦登上权力宝座，在心底信奉威权主义的民选民粹主义领导人——比如俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)或土耳其总统埃尔多安——就能够一面践踏城市中产阶级所珍视的各种自由，一面到小城镇或乡村去争取“真正”国民的支持。

Such actions undermine the common western assumption that the basis for all other freedoms is the vote. In fact, the west’s own history suggests that the vote can be the last freedom that is won – not the first.

这种行为颠覆了西方的一种普遍假定，即选举权是其他各种自由的根基。实际上，西方自身的历史表明，选举权可能是民众最后赢得的自由，而不是最先赢得的自由。

In Britain, respect for the independence of the courts and the freedom of the press were largely established by the 18th century.

在英国，到了18世纪时，对法庭独立性和新闻自由的尊重已基本确立。

But it was not until 1928 that all men and women over the age of 21 were guaranteed the vote. Throughout the Victorian era, it was conventional wisdom that basic levels of property and education were necessary before a citizen should be allowed to vote. When the franchise was widened in 1867, one British Conservative argued that school reform must now be an urgent priority, remarking gloomily – “we must educate our masters”.

但直到1928年时，年满21岁的男女公民才全部获得了选举权。在整个维多利亚时代(Victorian era)，人们普遍认为，公民只有拥有一定程度的财产、具备一定程度的教育背景，才能享有选举权。1867年英国扩大选举权适用范围时，一名保守党人士主张，学校改革必须成为目前的当务之急，他心情沉重地说道，“我们必须教育好我们的主人”。

Such thinking is now regarded as antiquated and indefensible in the west. But it may strike a chord with the emerging middle classes in much of the developing world. Western commentators have long predicted that a rising Chinese middle class would demand democracy. But, in fact, many affluent Chinese seem to fear that “chaos” would be unleashed if the peasantry were given an equal voice in the running of the country.

如今，这样的想法在西方已经过时、站不住脚了。但它可能会在许多发展中国家的新兴中产阶级当中引起共鸣。西方评论人士长期以来一直预测，崛起中的中国中产阶级将要求民主。但事实上，许多中国富人似乎担心，如果在治理国家方面给予农民平等的发言权，将会引发“混乱”。

Egyptian liberals, who are living with the effects of mass democracy in a society where about 40 per cent of the electorate is illiterate, might sympathise. Given the influence of the mosques and religious television channels, Egypt’s poor are likely to continue voting for Islamist parties – if they are given the chance.

埃及自由派人士可能会有同感，他们正在忍受大众民主带来的种种后果。在埃及，约有40%的选民不识字。考虑到清真寺和宗教电视频道的影响，埃及穷人很可能会继续投票支持伊斯兰主义政党——如果给予他们投票权的话。

Yet while the case of Egypt suggests that democracy can, on occasion, undermine other cherished freedoms, events in Cairo are also demonstrating that it is impossible to have a “liberal coup”. Once you overthrow an elected government you are in the business of repression. And that means censorship, rounding up political opponents and, quite often, shooting people in the streets. Democracy and freedom are not the same thing. But overthrowing a democracy tends to lead to the same, sad destination.

然而，尽管埃及的情况表明，民主有时能够破坏其他令人珍视的自由，但开罗发生的事件也表明，实现“自由的政变”是不可能的。一旦你推翻了一个民选政府，你就已然干上了“压迫”的勾当。这意味着实施审查、围捕政治对手，而且往往还意味着向街头抗议民众开枪。民主和自由不是一回事。但推翻民主却往往会导致同样的、悲哀的结局。