Few parts of the world have benefited as much from China’s rise as Latin America. In 1990, China was a lowly 17th on the list of destinations for Latin American exports. By 2011, it had become the number one export market for Brazil, Chile and Peru and number two for Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela. Over that time, annual trade rose from an unremarkable $8bn to an irreplaceable $230bn. Chinese leaders predict it will reach $400bn by 2017.

世界很少有哪个地区能够像拉丁美洲那样从中国的崛起中获得如此之多的好处。1990年，中国仅在拉美出口目的地中排名第17位。到2011年，中国已经成为巴西、智利、秘鲁的第一大出口市场，也是阿根廷、古巴、乌拉圭、哥伦比亚、委内瑞拉的第二大出口市场。在此期间，年度贸易额从不起眼的80亿美元增加到无可替代的2300亿美元。中国领导人预计，2017年这一数字将会达到4000亿美元。

As China builds its colossal cities, constructs its networks of highways and railways, and feeds its evermore carnivorous people, Latin America has much of what it takes to keep the show on the road. Chilean copper, Peruvian zinc and Brazilian iron ore are being shipped in vast quantities. The region is the Middle East of food, accounting for 40 per cent of global farming exports. It supplies water-poor China with dizzying amounts of beef, poultry, soya, corn, coffee and animal feed. If Chatinamerica rolled off the tongue as easily as Chindia or Chindonesia, someone would have coined the term long ago.

在中国建设大型城市、修建高速公路和铁路网、满足人们空前需求的过程中，拉美拥有中国所需要的很多原材料。智利的铜、秘鲁的锌、巴西的铁矿石大量运往中国。该地区是粮食的“中东”，占全球农业出口的40%。它为缺水的中国提供大量的牛肉、家禽、大豆、玉米、咖啡和动物饲料。如果“Chatinamerica”（意为中国与拉美）读起来跟“Chindia”（中印）、“Chindonesia”（“中国-印度-印尼”铁三角）一样顺口，这个词肯定早就被创造出来了。

The speed with which economic relations have flourished raises two important questions equally applicable to other parts of the world. First, what happens when Chinese growth and investment slows, a process that has already begun? Second, how can Latin America forge an economic relationship that is more than just a rerun of its commodity dependency of eras past?

这种经济关系蓬勃发展的速度，引出了两个对世界其他地区也同样重要的问题。第一，中国经济增长和投资放缓的时候会发生什么？其实这个过程已经开始。第二，拉美如何打造一种超越以往纯粹依赖大宗商品的经济关系？

To work out what might happen as China slows, we should first look at how different countries fared as it took off in the 1990s. As Alfredo Toro Hardy, a Venezuelan academic and diplomat, makes clear in his book, The World Turned Upside Down, there were losers as well as winners.

为了弄清楚中国经济放缓的影响，我们首先应该分析上世纪九十年代中国经济起飞时，不同国家有着怎样不同的“命运”。正如委内瑞拉学者兼外交官阿尔弗雷多•托罗•哈迪(Alfredo Toro Hardy)在他的著作《颠倒过来的世界》(The World Turned Upside Down)中明确指出的，既有失败的国家也有成功的国家。

Broadly, the losers were Mexico and the “Mexico-type economies” of Central America with low-cost maquiladora plants for assembly and manufacturing. For Mexico, a net importer of raw materials, including corn and soya, the rise in commodity prices accompanying China’s ascent had a largely negative impact. More important, as China’s manufacturing prowess grew, Mexico’s factories lost competitiveness. From 2001 to 2006 its share of US personal computer imports halved to 7 per cent. Over the same period China’s share more than tripled to 45 per cent.

总的来说，失败的国家就是墨西哥，以及中美洲的“墨西哥式经济体”——它们有着低成本的组装和制造加工出口工厂。拿墨西哥来说，它是包括玉米和大豆等原材料的纯进口国，中国的崛起带来的大宗商品价格上涨给其带来的主要是消极影响。更重要的是，随着中国制造业力量的增强，墨西哥的工厂失去了竞争力。从2001年到2006年，墨西哥占美国个人电脑进口比重减半到7%。与此同时，中国的比重则增加了两倍多，达到45%。

The winners were Brazil and the “Brazilian-type economies” of South America. Not only did China vastly increase its imports of commodities from the likes of Peru and Chile but the commodity supercycle also pushed prices of raw materials to record highs. Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski estimate in their book The Dragon in the Room that three-quarters of recent Latin American growth can be attributed to commodity exports. Growth rates in countries with the tightest trade links to China reached a rough average of 5 per cent.

成功的国家就是巴西和南美一些“巴西式经济体”。不仅中国大量增加从秘鲁和智利等国的大宗商品进口，而且大宗商品超级周期还将原材料的价格推到历史高点。凯文•加拉格尔(Kevin Gallagher)和罗伯特•波塞坎斯基(Roberto Porzecanski)在他们的《室中龙》(The Dragon in the Room)一书中估计，近年来拉美经济增长的四分之三都是大宗商品出口的贡献。与中国贸易关系最为密切的一些国家的平均经济增长率大约达到5%。

Yet even during the bonanza years, now ending, there were concerns. Cheap Chinese imports undermined Latin American manufacturers even in countries such as Brazil with a sophisticated industrial base. The currencies of commodity exporters appreciated – a classic case of “Dutch disease” – making their manufactured goods still less competitive. Some, such as Mr Toro Hardy, worried that over-reliance on commodities might imply “going back in time” to a primary export economy. For a high-technology producer such as Brazil, he said, this smacked of neo-colonialism.

然而，即使是在繁荣年代（并且它行将结束）也有很多担忧。廉价的中国进口产品损害了拉美制造商，甚至包括巴西等有着先进工业基础的国家的制造商。大宗商品出口国货币升值，使得它们的制造业产品竞争力进一步下降，这是一种典型的“荷兰病”(Dutch disease)。托罗•哈迪等一些人担忧，对大宗商品的过度依赖可能意味着“倒退到”初级出口型经济。他认为，对于巴西这类高技术生产国来说，这有一种新殖民主义的味道。

Such concerns, though they have particular resonance in Latin America, apply to other countries that have ridden China’s commodity train, from Australia to Mongolia. Many countries have bet the farm – or rather the mine – on everlasting demand from a China whose economy is now slowing.

尽管这些担忧在拉美引起了特别的共鸣，但也适用于其他依赖中国大宗商品需求的国家，包括澳大利亚和蒙古。很多国家都把农业或者矿业押注在中国永不枯竭的需求上，但现在中国经济却在放缓。

As China decelerates from double-digit growth to a projected 7.5 per cent this year, the economies of some commodity exporters have stumbled. Brazil is a case in point. Partly as a result of slowing exports to China and falling commodity prices – copper, iron ore and coal are 30-50 per cent off their 2011 peaks – it registered average growth of just 1.8 per cent in 2011 and 2012, down from a roaring 7.5 per cent in 2010.

随着中国经济增长率从两位数下降到今年预期的7.5%，一些大宗商品出口国的经济已经受挫。巴西就是一个例子。部分由于对中国的出口放缓以及大宗商品价格下降（铜、铁矿石、煤炭价格都比2011年最高峰下降30%到50%），巴西2011年和2012年的平均增长率仅为 1.8%，而2010年则高达7.5%。

That process could have further to go. China’s economy may slow more sharply than expected or it may rebalance more quickly from investment-led to consumption-driven growth. The Economist, perhaps prematurely, has already declared a structural “Great Deceleration” in emerging markets. In a report entitled If China sneezes, Nomura estimates the impact on several economies if 2014 growth in China’s $8tn-plus economy slips 1 percentage point below Nomura’s baseline forecast of 6.9 per cent. It finds that a 1 point fall would shave a further half-point off Latin American growth. Some countries such as Australia, down 0.7 per cent, and trade-dependent Singapore, down 1.3 per cent, would fare worse.

情况还不止这些。中国经济放缓程度可能会高于预期，中国从投资拉动型转向消费拉动型增长的再平衡步伐也可能会快于预期。虽然可能还不到时候，但《经济学人》(Economist)杂志已提出新兴市场进入了结构性“大减速”(Great Deceleration)。野村证券(Nomura)在其一份题为“如果中国打喷嚏”(If China sneezes)的报告中预测，如果规模超过8万亿美元的中国经济在2014年的增速，比野村证券的底线预期6.9%低1个百分点的话，会对几大经济体产生什么影响。报告得出结论，中国增速下降1个百分点会导致拉美增速下降0.5个百分点。一些国家面临的结果更严重，如澳大利亚会下降0.7个百分点，贸易依赖型的新加坡则会下降1.3个百分点。

It is not all bad. Mexico may actually have benefited from the changing nature of China’s economy, where higher wages have breathed new life into the maquiladora system. Nor has it suffered from the fall in commodity prices.

但也不是只有坏消息。实际上墨西哥可能已经从中国经济特征的变化中获益，工资的提高给其出口加工工厂体系注入了新的生命。大宗商品价格下跌也没有对其造成冲击。

Even in countries such as Brazil, the effects of a Chinese slowdown need not be all negative. China will continue to urbanise, putting a floor under metals prices. To the extent that its demand for hard commodities does slow, its appetite for meat and grains should rise. The key for Latin America – and for other suppliers of China’s needs – is to construct a trade relationship that maximises value added, even if that is only branding or processing raw materials. Canada, Australia and, closer to home, Chile show that being a first-rate commodity exporter does not necessarily mean having a second-rate economy.

即使对于巴西等国来说，中国经济放缓带来的也未必全是消极影响。中国将继续城市化，因此金属价格有个底线。虽然对硬大宗商品的需求确实下降，但中国对肉类和谷物的需求却会增加。对于拉美和中国的其他供应国来说，关键是要创建一种能够将附加值最大化的贸易关系，即使这种贸易只是原材料的品牌化或加工。远的加拿大、澳大利亚，近的智利，都显示出一流的大宗商品出口国未必就是二流的经济体。