James Carville, adviser to President Bill Clinton, once said that were he reincarnated, he would choose to return as the bond market: he could then intimidate anyone.

比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)总统的顾问詹姆斯•卡维尔(James Carville)曾说，如果他能够转世，他就会选择变成债券市场：这样他就可以恫吓任何人。

There is little doubt of the reality of such intimidation. In its manifesto for the 2010 UK general election, the Conservative party listed a series of “economic benchmarks for Britain”. Top of the list: “We will safeguard Britain’s credit rating .” The following year, President Nicolas Sarkozy was reported to have told aides “if France loses its triple A rating, I’m dead”. A few days later France lost that status; a few months later, Mr Sarkozy was out of office.

这种恫吓的现实几乎是毫无疑问的。2010年英国大选宣言中，保守党列出了“英国的一系列经济基准”。排在首位的是：“我们将捍卫英国的信用评级”。据报道，第二年，尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)总统告诉他的助理“如果法国丢掉了AAA评级，我就完蛋了。”几天之后，法国就丢掉了这个地位，几个月之后萨科齐果然在大选中落败。

A sovereign credit rating supposedly reflects the likelihood that a country will default on its government debt. But is Britain or France likely to default? And should their governments care what Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or bond traders think, anyway?

主权信用评级应该是反映一个国家政府债务违约的可能性。那么英国和法国有可能会违约吗？这些国家的政府应不应该在意穆迪(Moody’s)、标普(Standard & Poor’s)或者债券交易商的看法？

When that Tory manifesto was written in 2010, government interest costs were about 2 per cent of national income – the lowest figure for 100 years. Since then, the percentage has risen slightly but by less than the amount of outstanding debt. The average interest rate has fallen because current rates are below historic ones and the refinancing of maturing debt lowers the overall cost. And these figures overstate the true cost of borrowing, since much of the higher-yielding debt is owned, through the Bank of England, by the government itself.

2010年保守党写这份宣言的时候，英国政府利息成本大约是国民收入的2%，为100年来的最低点。从那之后，这一比例略微上升，但小于未偿付债务的增幅。平均利率在下降，因为当前利率低于历史水平，到期债务的再融资降低了整体成本。而且这些数据夸大了借贷的真正成本，因为很多高收益率债务是通过英国央行(BOE)由政府自身持有的。

In the past, the UK government has serviced interest costs that were, in relative terms, more than three times what they are today, without the faintest suggestion of default. (I pass over the embarrassing question of liabilities to the US incurred during the first world war, some of which were conveniently overlooked during the negotiations over German reparations. I also pass over the risk that a future government might acquiesce in accelerating inflation, a real risk but not the one described in the credit rating.)

相对而言，过去英国政府的利息成本是现在的三倍多，却没有任何人提到违约的可能性。（我忽略了一战期间英国对美国欠下的债务这个尴尬的问题，其中一些债务在协商德国赔款期间直接抵消了。我也忽略了未来某届政府默许通胀加速的风险，这是一个真实的风险，但不是信用评级中描述的那种风险。）

The prospect that the British government will renege on its bonds is probably even lower than that for other major economies. America’s dysfunctional congressional budgetary process means that a technical default is a possibility, even though the capacity of the US to repay its creditors is infinite. Japan has a formidably high ratio of debt to gross domestic product, while Germany and France have relinquished control over their money supply to the European Central Bank. Britain has a powerful executive, a more manageable debt level and a printing press.

英国政府在债券上违约的可能性，很可能低于其他主要经济体。美国功能失调的国会预算程序意味着技术违约是一种可能性，即使美国政府偿还债权人的能力是无限的。日本债务占其国内生产总值(GDP)的比重高得可怕，而德国和法国已将各自对货币供应的控制权交给欧洲央行(ECB)。英国有着一个强大的行政管理部门、更加可控的债务水平和印钞机。

The detached observer would conclude that the UK government failing to repay its sterling obligations is a risk commensurable with the prospect of a meteorite falling on one’s head and much less than the likelihood of being struck by lightning. It is simply not the sort of thing a sensible person would worry about, absent political earthquakes or global conflict; and then there would be plenty of other things to fret about first.

超然的观察家会得出结论认为，英国政府不能偿还其债务的风险与陨星坠落到人头的风险相当，比被雷电击中的可能性要小得多。只要没有政治动荡或者全球冲突，一个理性的人不会担忧这样的事。若真有那样的大乱，也还有很多其他的事要先操心。

The observable reality is that today the British – and other advanced country governments – can borrow for 50 years at an interest rate of about zero in real terms, the lowest in centuries. Any government worried about future financing needs should issue as much debt as possible at very long maturities – and issue it to the market rather than the central bank.

一个明显的现实是，如今英国以及其他发达国家的政府，能够以接近于零的实际利率借款50年，这是数百年来的最低点。任何担忧未来融资需求的政府，都应该尽可能多地发行长期债券，并且是向市场（而不是央行）发行。

Even if there are few good reasons why anyone should anticipate a UK default, traders and rating agencies might persuade each other that such an event is imminent. But if you have the resources and powers available to the government, this kind of irrationality is as much an opportunity as a problem. Since the government is not in fact going to default, it can print whatever money is needed to repurchase the supposedly risky debt, refinancing it when traders finally get the message. These are the very policies the Bank of England is pursuing now – but in a context in which there would be an expectation of financial profit rather than of loss.

即使没有什么理由让任何人认为英国会违约，但交易商和评级机构可能会说服彼此相信：这样的情况即将发生。但如果你有政府可用的资源和实力，这种不理性既是问题，也是机会。因为政府实际上不会违约，它可以根据任何需要无限量地印钞，回购所谓的高风险债务，在交易商最终醒悟的时候进行再融资。这些就是英国央行目前正在执行的政策——在预期财务利润而不是亏损的背景下。

So how do bond markets acquire their power to intimidate? Politicians spend too much time talking to people who take a daily interest in the bond market, and come to believe that their obsessions are important. Britain’s economic performance should be judged by benchmarks relating to employment, productivity, growth and innovation, not credit ratings.

那么债券市场是如何获得恫吓的威力的呢？政客们花太多的时间与那些每天关注债券市场的人交流，最终相信他们的“痴迷”是重要的。英国的经济表现应该用就业、生产率、增长以及创新方面的基准来评判，而不是信用评级。