The monetary policy of the European Central Bank has been too tight. This is shown in the fall of core annual inflation to just 0.8 per cent in the year to October 2013. The case for the monetary easing undertaken last week was overwhelming. Indeed, it was long overdue.

欧洲央行(ECB)的货币政策近来一直过紧，这体现于2013年10月的核心年通胀率降至0.8%。上周的放松货币政策之举势在必行。的确，早就应该这么做了。

Yet, it has been leaked, the decision to cut the refinancing rate from ? per cent to ? per cent split the council. Both German representatives – J?rg Asmussen, a member of the ECB’s board, and Jens Weidmann, head of the Bundesbank – as well as the heads of the central banks of the Netherlands and Austria voted against this move.

但据透露，在是否要将再融资利率从0.5%下调到0.25%的问题上，委员会产生了分歧。两名德国代表——欧洲央行执行董事会成员约尔格·阿斯穆森(J?rg Asmussen)和德国央行行长延斯·魏德曼(Jens Weidmann)——以及荷兰和奥地利央行行长都投了反对票。

Open splits on national lines have emerged previously, but only over controversial programmes such as the Securities Markets Programme, launched under Jean-Claude Trichet, Mario Draghi’s predecessor as president of the ECB, and the Outright Monetary Transactions programme, launched by Mr Draghi in the summer of 2012. Both of these initiatives were intended to relieve market pressure on sovereign bonds. That was bound to be controversial, given German hostility to monetary financing of governments. But such splits over standard monetary policy decisions are new. This matters: they endanger the legitimacy of the ECB – and so of the monetary union.

基于国家立场的公开分歧以前也出现过，但只是围绕一些有争议的计划，比如欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)的前任让-克洛德·特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)推出的证券市场计划(Securities Markets Programme)，以及德拉吉在2012年夏季推出的直接货币交易(Outright Monetary Transactions)计划。这两个计划都是为了缓解市场对主权债券的压力。鉴于德国反对面向政府的货币融资，这注定会引发争议。但在标准货币政策决定上的这类分歧还是新事。这很重要：它们危及欧洲央行乃至整个货币联盟的合法性。

Some have even accused Mr Draghi of acting in the interests of Italy – and the objections of German representatives to the easing are bound to stimulate such suspicions. Yet the case for a cut in the ECB’s standard policy rate is, in truth, overwhelming: core inflation is now less than half the ECB’s target of “below, but close to, 2 per cent”.

一些人甚至指责德拉吉出于意大利的利益降息，而德国代表对放松货币政策的反对势必助长这样的疑虑。但实际上，欧洲央行下调标准政策利率的理由是压倒性的：目前核心通胀还不到欧洲央行“低于但接近于2%”这一目标的一半。

As Mr Draghi argued, there are compelling reasons for not putting up with inflation below that level. First, an inflation rate recorded at 2 per cent might, in truth, be close to zero: inflation is almost certainly exaggerated at the moment in conventional measurements.

正如德拉吉所主张的，有强大理由不让通胀低于目标水平。第一，2%的通胀率事实上可能接近于零：按照传统测算方式，目前通胀几乎肯定被夸大了。

Second, needed changes in competitiveness inside the eurozone would be difficult even if average inflation were 2 per cent. They would be far harder at close to zero, given the resistance of workers to nominal wage cuts.

第二，即使平均通胀率是2%，欧元区内部在竞争力方面的必要改革也是困难的。考虑到工人反对削减名义工资，在通胀率接近于零的情况下，此类改革的难度会大得多。

Third, monetary policy tends to be more ineffective the closer inflation comes to zero, partly because depressed economies may well need negative real interest rates – which are much easier to implement when inflation rates are positive.

第三，通胀越接近于零，货币政策的效果就越不明显，部分原因是低迷经济体很可能需要负数的实际利率——当通胀率是正数的时候，这一政策更容易执行。

To these I would add a fourth: the eurozone risks falling into deflation, given excess capacity and high unemployment. The ECB says that inflation expectations are anchored. That might prove hubristic.

我还要补充第四点：由于产能过剩和高失业率，欧元区面临着陷入通缩的风险。欧洲央行有关通胀预期得到锚定的说法可能过分自信。

It is easy to identify other reasons why policy has been too tight. Between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2013, nominal eurozone demand expanded by just 1 per cent. Nominal gross domestic product grew by a mere 3.4 per cent. Moreover, so-called M3 money – a measure of the “broad” money supply – has been virtually stagnant since late 2008. (See charts.)

认为政策过紧的其他理由也很容易找到。从2008年第一季度到2013年第二季度，欧元区名义需求仅增加了1%。名义国内生产总值(GDP)只增长了3.4%。此外，2008年末以来，M3广义货币供应量几乎处于停滞状态。（见图表）

What, then, are the arguments against last Thursday’s decision? One was that the decision could well be postponed. But it has already been postponed too long: the longer the delay, the greater the danger. A second concern is that this move brings unconventional measures even closer. But the less promptly the ECB uses conventional measures, the greater the likelihood that extreme ones will be needed. If the ECB had moved rates decisively towards zero in 2010, it might have avoided at least some of today’s difficulties.

那么反对上周四降息决定的观点是什么呢？观点之一就是：该决定完全可以推迟作出。但它已经拖了太长的时间：拖延越久，危险就越大。第二个担忧是，此举让非传统措施离我们更近。但欧洲央行越晚采取传统措施，以后需要出台极端措施的可能性就越大。如果2010年的时候，欧洲央行果断将利率下调至接近于零，它也许至少能够避免现在的一些困难。

Another complaint is that interest rates on German savings are too low. As Beno?t C?uré, a member of the ECB Board, has argued, this is wrong. First, savings have little value during a deep slump, such as that in the eurozone. Second, the principal determinant of the return on German savings is the long-term yield on German bunds, which is now 1.8 per cent on 10-year debt. But it is the slump, plus Germany’s role as a safe haven, that creates such low rates. The less effective is the support provided to the eurozone economy, the more bunds will stay a safe haven and so the lower the return on German savings will be.

另一个抱怨是，德国储蓄利率过低。正如欧洲央行执行董事会成员伯努瓦·克雷(Beno?t C?uré)所指出的，这是错误的。首先，在欧元区所处的这种深度经济低迷期，储蓄没什么价值。第二，德国储蓄收益的主要决定因素是德国国债的长期收益率，目前10年期德国国债的收益率是1.8%。但导致如此低利率的原因，正是经济低迷以及德国作为避风港的地位。向欧元区经济提供的支持越是没有效果，德国国债就越有可能保持避风港地位，德国储蓄的收益也将越低。

A final concern is that the monetary policy of the ECB is unsuitable for Germany and might even cause asset price bubbles. This is surely true, just as the monetary policy pursued before 2007 was unsuitable for Ireland and Spain and did indeed drive asset price bubbles. A central bank called upon to deliver a target rate of inflation in a union of diverse economies will destabilise nearly all the members at some time. But that is what joining a currency union entails for all members, including even the largest.

最后一个担忧是，对德国来说，欧洲央行的货币政策是不合适的，甚至可能导致资产价格泡沫。这肯定不假，正像2007年之前欧洲央行追求的货币政策对爱尔兰和西班牙也是不合适的，并且确实造成了资产价格泡沫。欧洲央行要为一个由多样化经济体组成的联盟保持通胀目标区间，在某个阶段必然会破坏几乎所有成员国的稳定。但这是加入一个货币联盟的任何成员所必须承受的，最大的成员也不例外。

Between 2001 and 2007, the average core inflation rate of the eurozone was 1.8 per cent, with Germany on 1.1 per cent and Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain close to 3 per cent. If the overall inflation rate is to remain close to 2 per cent, while the inflation rates of the latter four countries, plus Italy, are to be well below this average, that of Germany and other surplus countries needs to be well above 2 per cent. Otherwise, overall inflation will be far too low. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are likely to be negative in these higher-inflation countries, just as they were for those now in such difficulties, prior to 2008. Efforts to resist such adjustments guarantee a persistent crisis and so the low interest rates the critics detest.

2001年至2007年，欧元区平均核心通胀率为1.8%，德国为1.1%，爱尔兰、希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙都接近3%。如果整体通胀率要保持在接近2%的水平，而后4个国家再加上意大利的通胀率要保持在远低于这个平均水平，那么德国以及其他盈余国家的通胀率需要远远超过2%。否则，整体通胀率将变得太低。另外，在这些通胀率较高的国家，实际短期利率可能已变为负值，就像如今陷入困境的国家在2008年之前的情况一样。抵制这种调整的努力必定会让危机持续，因此肯定会带来批评者所痛恨的低利率。

Many in Germany might conclude that they would be better off outside the eurozone. I sympathise, But they should be careful what they wish for. In the absence of a currency union, a putative D-Mark would soar. The impact of a large real appreciation of the new currency would be similar to what has befallen Japan: large parts of German manufacturing output would shift into neighbouring countries; the economy would surely be pushed into a recession; and domestic prices would probably fall.

德国很多人可能会得出结论认为，如果离开欧元区，他们的境况会变得更好。我对此表示同情，但他们对于自己的愿望应保持谨慎。如果没有货币同盟，假定存在的德国马克汇率将飙升。这种新货币实际汇率大幅上涨所产生的影响，将与日本的遭遇类似：德国很大一部分制造业产出将转移到邻国；该国经济肯定会陷入衰退；国内物价可能会下跌。

Without heroic unconventional measures, to which the Bundesbank is fiercely opposed, the deflationary spiral might be steep. Some Germans would benefit. But the dislocations could be huge. Compared to that, the costs associated with a successful eurozone adjustment, including a period of, say, 3 per cent inflation in Germany, would hardly be excessive.

若不是英勇果断的非传统措施（德国央行坚决反对这类举措），通缩螺旋可能很陡峭。一些德国人将因此受益。但可能会有大规模混乱。相比之下，与成功的欧元区调整相关的成本（包括德国出现一段时期的3%的通胀率）算不上过高。

Yes, the ECB cannot deliver optimal monetary policy for Germany: it is not supposed to do so. But its easy money policy might still be far better than the alternatives.

没错，欧洲央行不可能为德国带来最优货币政策：它本来就不该这样做。但其宽松货币政策或许还是要远远好于其他选择。