| Finally, Chinese leaders have admitted what the market has been saying for some time: defaults by Chinese borrowers are all but inevitable, possibly on a significant scale. Responding to questions at a news conference last week, Li Keqiang, the Chinese premier, admitted that “isolated cases of default will be unavoidable”. |
| 中国领导人终于承认了已经在市场上流传了一段时间的说法：中国发生债务违约几乎是不可避免的，违约规模或许还不小。日前在记者会上回答有关金融产品违约的问题时，中国总理李克强承认“个别情况难以避免”。 |
| Few are likely to share Mr Li’s optimistic view that only “isolated cases of default” will occur. Still, by speaking publicly of the possibility that investors will suffer losses on credit products, he indicated that Beijing may be ready to face the consequences of its decision to prop up growth with credit-fuelled investment. In the past five years credit has grown at an average of 20 per cent a year, more than double the average rate of economic growth over the same period. An astonishing $14tn of new credit has been extended since 2008. Much of this has been spent on building fixed assets such as infrastructure, real estate and factories. |
| 李克强认为只会出现“个别违约情况”，这种乐观看法大概没有多少人赞同。不过，他公开指出信贷产品投资者可能要蒙受损失，这显示出中国政府可能已准备面对一直以来依赖信贷驱动的投资支撑经济增长的后果。过去5年里，信贷平均每年增长20%，增幅是同期经济增长率的两倍以上。2008年至今，新增信贷高达14万亿美元。大部分贷款被用于基础设施、房地产和厂房等固定资产建设。 |
| Unfortunately a large portion of this investment – it is impossible to say how much – has been squandered on speculative property ventures, useless infrastructure and excess manufacturing capacity. To make matters worse, inadequate financial regulation has allowed borrowers of doubtful standing to gorge on a seemingly endless flow of loans. |
| 遗憾的是，这些投资中很大一部分（无法给出确切数值）被浪费在投机性房地产项目、无用的基础设施以及建设过剩的制造业产能上。更糟糕的是，金融监管力度不足，使得信誉可疑的借款人得以享用仿佛源源不断的贷款。 |
| As China’s macroeconomic environment deteriorates, a vicious cycle has taken hold. Slowing growth prolongs the country’s overcapacity problem, depresses prices of goods (such as coal and steel) that have attracted large speculative investments, and destroys the profitability of projects built on rosy assumptions of continuing high growth. The day of reckoning has now arrived. Beijing has two options, both of them unpalatable. It can either admit the obvious and start deleveraging, reducing the rate of credit issuance and allowing borrowers to default when they cannot meet their obligations. Or it can continue to prop up zombie borrowers with more credit. |
| 随着中国宏观经济环境变差，一个恶性循环由此形成。经济增长放缓延长了产能过剩问题的持续时间，压低了吸引大量投机性资金的产品（如煤炭和钢铁）的价格，并摧毁了基于经济继续快速增长的乐观假设而上马的项目的盈利性。眼下，清算的日子到了。中国政府有两个选择，两个都不愉快：一是承认明显的事实，开始推动去杠杆，降低信贷投放规模，并允许债务人在无力偿债时违约；二是继续提供更多贷款支持“僵尸借款人”（zombie borrower，指多次未及时偿债、坏账风险很高的债务人——译者注）。 |
| Should it opt for the latter, a deceptive calm may last for a year or two. But when the inevitable crisis arrives it will be disastrous. According to estimates by Fitch Ratings, at the current rate of credit growth, China’s ratio of debt to gross domestic product will exceed 270 per cent by 2017. Interest payments alone will reach 20 per cent of GDP in that year. |
| 如果选择后一种做法，中国经济表面上或许还可以维持一、两年平静，但这种平静带有欺骗性。当危机不可避免地到来时，那将是一场灾难。据惠誉评级(Fitch Ratings)估计，按照目前的信贷增长速度，中国债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比到2017年将超过270%，仅应偿付利息与GDP之比就会达到20%。 |
| Mr Li’s remarks last week suggest that Beijing may have decided to accept some intense pain now to forestall a future calamity. If so, we should applaud the Chinese leaders’ courage. Nevertheless, Mr Li and his colleagues will encounter serious difficulties in restructuring China’s debt-laden economy. Four challenges stand out. |
| 李克强在记者会上的言论显示，中国政府可能已经决定在现阶段承受一定的剧痛，以防未来灾难降临。如果真的是这样，我们应当赞扬中国领导人的勇气。不过，李克强及其同僚要调整存在严重债务问题的中国经济将遇到一些重大困难，尤其突出的是以下四点。 |
| First, Beijing’s newfound reluctance to offer bailouts indiscriminately may have the unintended effect of undermining confidence in the solvency of a wide range of borrowers. This could prompt a credit squeeze that produces more default than is desired. |
| 首先，中国政府开始不愿继续无差别地提供纾困，这或许会产生意外后果，挫伤投资者对大量借款人偿债能力的信心。结果可能会引发一轮信贷紧缩，从而导致大批违约事件发生，这将是政府不愿看到的。 |
| The withdrawal of the government’s implicit guarantee will make lenders less willing to extend new credit or to renew old loans. This will almost certainly force a large number of borrowers into default – including some with viable plans that would eventually have enabled them to repay their debts. Even relatively healthy borrowers are likely to suffer. |
| 没有了政府的隐性担保，放贷机构投放新贷款或对旧贷款进行展期的意愿将减弱。这几乎肯定会迫使大量债务人违约——其中一些债务人可能已制定了可行的方案，最终会有能力偿债。即便是相对健康的债务人也很可能遭到冲击。 |
| Second, many Chinese debt contracts are guaranteed by third parties. If one borrower is unable to make good on its promises, the event could trigger a series of further failures, as entities that have stood behind the defaulting borrower are themselves unable to fulfil their obligations. Systemic risks could be far bigger than the Chinese authorities assume, and may reside in unexpected corners of the financial system. The ensuing shocks could cause severe damage to the real economy. |
| 其次，中国许多债务合同是由第三方担保的。如果一名债务人无法履约，可能引发一系列违约，因为为违约债务人提供担保的实体本身可能也跟着无法履行偿债义务。系统性风险可能远超中国当局的设想，并且可能出自金融体系中的一些令人意想不到的角落。接踵而至的冲击可能严重损害实体经济。 |
| Third, the task of determining which borrower should go bust is unavoidably political. At present China lacks market-based institutions and procedures for bankruptcy, restructuring and liquidation. Government officials will be deciding which borrowers should be bailed out, and which should be allowed to go under. It is easy to imagine a politically driven process resulting in the survival of the best-connected borrowers rather than the fittest. |
| 第三，确定应该让哪些债务人违约，将不可避免地是一个带有政治色彩的任务。目前中国在破产、重组和清算方面缺乏基于市场的机制和流程。政府官员将决定该对哪些债务人实施纾困，该让哪些倒下。可想而知，这个过程将受到政治因素的左右，最终存活下来的债务人不是那些最应该被救助的，而是那些关系最硬的。 |
| Finally, imposing financial discipline on the Chinese economy through default and credit retrenchment will make it harder to meet Beijing’s growth target of 7.5 per cent for 2014. To strengthen the credibility of their commitment to reform, Chinese leaders need to consider abandoning this artificial objective so that they will have more freedom to implement painful financial restructuring. |
| 最后，通过违约和信贷紧缩的形式在中国经济中树立金融纪律，将使得中国政府更难实现2014年经济增长7.5%的目标。为增强市场对政府改革决心的信任，中国政府必须考虑放弃这种人为设定的目标，这样他们才会有更大的自由来实施痛苦的金融改革。 |
| Mr Li’s candour on loan defaults is only a small step in the right direction. Beijing needs to show more resolve to restore stability in the financial sector. |
| 李克强对贷款违约问题的坦率回答只是朝正确的方向迈出了一小步。中国政府必须展现更大决心，以恢复金融领域的稳定性。 |
